Stephanie Heijdra: An Excellent UK Barrister for Complex Family Law Cases, International Child Custody, Child Residence, and Grandparents' Rights

FO v PN [2025] EWFC 327 (B) (Central Family Court, HHJ Edward Hess, judgment 9 May 2025) is a financial remedies case where the decisive issue was what weight the court should give to a Deed of Revocation (DOR) made during the marriage, revoking a 2012 pre-nuptial agreement (PNA) and replacing it with an “equal sharing” framework shortly before separation.  Core facts and documents The parties signed a PNA on 22 May 2012, shortly before their June 2012 marriage. It was common ground that the PNA was consensually executed at the time and, if applied, would have produced an unequal capital outcome in the husband’s favour (though the judge viewed it as objectively reasonable for its time and context). The court also had a DOR dated 28 April 2022. The DOR revoked the PNA in terms and stated an intention to continue the marriage “as equal partners”, with both parties receiving English family law advice, and it provided (in substance) that assets would be treated as matrimonial and equally shared on divorce (subject to needs). Not long after the DOR, the marriage broke down; on the judge’s findings, the “gap” between the DOR and the tentative decision to separate was several months (April to about September 2022), including continued cohabitation and a family holiday in August 2022. The legal question the court had to answer The court’s job under MCA 1973 s25 was to decide a fair outcome, giving appropriate weight to any nuptial agreement(s). Here, the question was not simply “is a PNA generally to be upheld?”, but: which agreement should carry weight in the s25 discretionary exercise, and in particular whether the DOR should be treated as the operative agreement or disregarded so the court effectively “falls back” on the 2012 PNA. HHJ Hess anchored his approach in the familiar Radmacher principles: vitiating factors (duress, fraud, misrepresentation), and also “undue pressure” or exploitation of a dominant position can reduce or eliminate the weight to be attached to an agreement. The husband’s attacks on the DOR (and why they failed) The husband’s case (advanced by Ms Phipps KC) was, in broad terms, that the DOR should be given no (or minimal) weight, because it was procured in circumstances that made it unfair to hold him to it, particularly given how soon the marriage ended afterwards. The judgment deals with three main strands of attack: A) Alleged misrepresentation / “orchestrated plan” to procure the DOR The husband alleged the wife never intended to continue the marriage, and effectively “pretended” to do so to secure the DOR, describing it as the culmination of a plan and that her behaviour changed immediately after signing. HHJ Hess rejected that account in strong terms. He found the wife credible, supported by contemporaneous communications, and found that she genuinely hoped the marriage would improve, including through therapy and through the “underlining of equality” introduced by the DOR. He also found continued cohabitation into summer 2022 and treated the “switch flicked” narrative as unsustainable on a close analysis. Practical point: If a party wants to argue that a mid-marriage variation/revocation was induced by deception about continuing the marriage, the court will look hard at contemporaneous evidence and the overall timeline. Allegations pitched as quasi-fraudulent require solid proof; otherwise they can backfire badly (including on costs, as happened here). B) Undue pressure / lack of free choice The judge accepted that the husband had a “difficult choice”, but held that a difficult choice is still a choice. Critically, the husband had proper advice (including warnings that the DOR could be disadvantageous), understood the potential consequences, and nonetheless chose to sign. He was described as a mature, experienced businessman, with no vulnerability comparable to cases where an agreement was set aside due to exploitation of vulnerability. The judge also rejected any suggestion of an ultimatum by the wife. He reinforced this with the point (drawing analogy from the PNA context) that some pressure is “commonplace” in agreement-making; something more is required to reach the threshold of undue pressure as a vitiating factor. C) “Too quick a breakdown” and “too big a swing” as a fairness reason to disregard the DOR This was essentially a plea that, even if not vitiated, the DOR should be disregarded as unfair because the marriage ended soon afterwards and the difference between DOR-outcome and PNA-outcome was very large. HHJ Hess did not accept that this justified ignoring the DOR. He treated agreement certainty as important, and expressly endorsed the proposition that parties who go to the effort of formal nuptial agreements, with advice, should ordinarily be held to them absent something fundamental undermining them. The weight ultimately given to the DOR The judge held that the DOR was a “magnetic factor” for the capital outcome and rejected the husband’s case that the court should disregard it in favour of the earlier PNA. This is the key doctrinal takeaway: a properly-advised, formally executed Deed of Revocation/variation made during marriage can carry very substantial weight (potentially overriding an earlier PNA), even if the relationship collapses comparatively soon after, unless a genuine vitiating factor is proved. How the weight translated into the final outcome Because the DOR contemplated equal sharing, the court’s capital approach was essentially equal division of the asset base (subject to some adjustments, including tax). The total asset base was found to be about £19.95m and the judge proceeded on an equal division basis, targeting approximately £9.976m for the wife (subject to sharing a later-emerged tax liability). He anticipated implementation via (among other steps) transfer of the FMH to the husband and Flats E & F to the wife, “Wells sharing” for certain EIS shareholdings, and transfers from joint assets (mainly the investment portfolio) to equalise. Spousal maintenance was dismissed both ways (clean break) given the scale of capital. Costs consequences tied to the DOR issue A notable practical feature is that the DOR fight had costs consequences. HHJ Hess said the husband’s argument to disregard the DOR “was never a strong one” and became unreasonable to pursue to trial once the factual matrix was clear, particularly in light of how the wife rebutted the misrepresentation narrative. He made a summary costs contribution order of £100,000 payable by the husband to the wife (added to the sum needed to equalise). This is a warning: in “agreement weight” litigation, if the evidential basis for vitiation is thin, persisting with serious allegations (especially quasi-fraud) can trigger an adverse costs order. What this case adds, in practical terms Revocation deeds can be outcome-determinative, not just “background” This judgment treats a DOR as capable of being the dominant agreement in the s25 exercise, effectively displacing an earlier PNA. Timing alone (DOR signed shortly before separation) is not enough A short-ish interval between signing and breakdown did not, by itself, justify ignoring the DOR. Advice, warnings, and understanding matter hugely The court put weight on the husband’s legal and financial advice (including warnings), his understanding of what he might be giving away, and his maturity and experience. Alleging deception about continuing the marriage is hard The court scrutinised contemporaneous messages and actual conduct; mere inference from “it ended soon after” was not enough. For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra direct access family barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk

A decision of Peel J addressing the threshold stage of Part III MFPA 1984 proceedings and the protective use of land registration restrictions .

A legal analysis of Re (Children: s.37 Direction) [2025] EWHC 2464 (Fam) , focusing on the High Court’s intervention in entrenched private law proceedings and the significance of the use of sections 37 and 38 of the Children Act 1989 . 1. Context and background This case arose out of long-running and highly conflicted private law proceedings concerning four children, referred to as A, B, C and D . The litigation history was characterised by: Findings of abuse against the father , and Findings of alienating behaviour by the mother . Despite the private law framework, the court was increasingly concerned that the children were being exposed to serious emotional harm , and potentially wider welfare risks, arising from the parents’ conduct and the entrenched nature of the dispute. The case therefore reached a point where the court considered that private law mechanisms were no longer sufficient to safeguard the children. 2. The statutory framework a. Section 37 Children Act 1989 A section 37 direction empowers the court, in private law proceedings, to require a local authority to investigate whether care or supervision proceedings should be issued where it appears that a child may be suffering, or likely to suffer, significant harm. It represents a threshold-crossing moment , signalling that the court considers the concerns to be potentially serious enough to justify public law intervention. b. Section 38 Children Act 1989 Under section 38 , the court may make interim care orders (ICOs) once public law proceedings are underway or anticipated, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the threshold criteria are met and where such orders are necessary to safeguard the children pending final determination. The making of ICOs alongside a s.37 direction is exceptional , but not unlawful, where the court considers immediate protective measures are required. 3. Why the court intervened The High Court’s decision reflects a cumulative assessment of risk rather than a single incident. Key factors included: The co-existence of abuse and alienation , creating a toxic emotional environment for the children. The failure of private law orders to bring stability or reduce harm. The risk that the children were being placed in an intolerable loyalty conflict , undermining their emotional and psychological development. The concern that without decisive intervention, the children would continue to be exposed to chronic harm through parental conflict . The court was clear that this was not a routine escalation , but a necessary response to a situation that had become unmanageable within the private law sphere. 4. The making of interim care orders a. Legal justification The court was satisfied that: There were reasonable grounds to believe that the children had suffered, or were likely to suffer, significant harm. The harm was attributable not only to discrete acts, but to patterns of parental behaviour over time . Immediate protective oversight by the local authority was required pending the outcome of the s.37 investigation. Accordingly, interim care orders were made in respect of all four children . b. Significance of ICOs for all siblings The decision to make ICOs for each child underscores an important principle: Where harm arises from a shared family dynamic , the court is entitled to treat siblings collectively rather than artificially separating their welfare analysis. The court recognised that differential orders would risk fragmenting decision-making and potentially compounding harm. 5. Key principles reinforced by the judgment The case reinforces several important themes in modern family law: Private law disputes can become public law cases Where parental conflict, abuse, or alienation reaches a level of significant harm, the court will not hesitate to involve the state. Alienation can justify public law intervention Particularly when combined with abuse findings, alienating behaviour may amount to emotional harm of a degree sufficient to engage the public law threshold. The court’s duty is proactive, not passive The court is not confined to the remedies sought by the parties; it must act where child protection concerns emerge. Sibling welfare must be viewed holistically Harm affecting family dynamics can justify uniform protective orders across all children. 6. Practical and procedural significance For practitioners, the case is a reminder that: Repeated, entrenched litigation can itself become evidence of harm . A s.37 direction is not merely investigative; it can be the gateway to immediate public law orders . Courts are increasingly alert to the combined impact of abuse and alienation , rather than treating them as competing narratives. 7. Conclusion Re (Children: s.37 Direction) [2025] EWHC 2464 (Fam) illustrates a decisive judicial response to a private law case that had crossed the threshold into child protection territory . The making of a section 37 direction, coupled with interim care orders under section 38, reflects the court’s conclusion that the children’s welfare could no longer wait for parental resolution . The case stands as a clear example of the court’s willingness to reframe private law disputes as public law concerns where the facts demand it. For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra direct access family barrister via sheijdra@winvolvedlegal.co.uk

A legal analysis of Re J (Surrogacy: Adoption Order) [2025] EWHC 2960 (Fam) , focusing on the court’s reasoning, the risks identified by the judge, and its wider implications for surrogacy law and practice. 1. Overview of the case In Re J (A Child) (Surrogacy: Adoption Order) [2025] EWHC 2960 (Fam) , Ms Justice Henke described the proceedings as a “cautionary tale” illustrating what can go wrong when strangers meet through social media to pursue surrogacy arrangements and take risks around conception . The case concerned J , a child aged approximately 2½ years , whose early life had been overshadowed by protracted and highly complex litigation . The proceedings were significantly prolonged because the parties misled the court about genetic testing , undermining trust, delaying welfare decisions, and complicating the legal route to securing J’s permanent family placement. Ultimately, the court made an adoption order , notwithstanding that adoption is generally regarded as a last resort in family law. 2. Factual background a. Informal, unregulated surrogacy The surrogacy arrangement was informal and privately arranged , with the parties having met via social media . There was no robust legal or professional framework governing the arrangement. Decisions around conception were taken without sufficient regard to: future legal parenthood, evidential clarity (particularly genetics), or the child’s long-term welfare. b. Misleading the court A critical feature of the case was that one or more parties provided misleading information to the court about genetic testing . This had serious consequences: It delayed the determination of who was genetically related to the child . It obstructed the court’s ability to assess: parental responsibility, lawful routes to parenthood (parental order vs adoption), and the child’s welfare. It fundamentally undermined the integrity of the proceedings . Ms Justice Henke treated this conduct as a grave matter, emphasising the court’s reliance on honesty in cases involving children. 3. Legal framework a. Surrogacy and parental orders Under English law: Surrogacy arrangements are not enforceable . The surrogate is the child’s legal mother at birth . Intended parents usually seek legal parenthood via a parental order under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, provided strict criteria are met, including: a genetic connection, proper consent, and compliance with statutory time limits. In this case, the misleading evidence about genetics fatally undermined the possibility of a lawful parental order. b. Adoption as a last resort Adoption represents a complete legal severance from a child’s birth family and is permissible only where: nothing else will meet the child’s welfare needs, and it is necessary and proportionate . The court was therefore required to confront whether, despite the surrogacy context, adoption had become the only viable route to provide J with legal security and permanence. 4. The court’s reasoning a. Welfare as the paramount consideration Ms Justice Henke reaffirmed that J’s welfare throughout his life was the court’s paramount consideration . By the time of the final hearing: J was already 2½ years old . He required certainty, stability, and legal clarity . Further delay would have been positively harmful . The court was clear that the litigation itself had already caused unacceptable delay in securing permanence. b. Consequences of dishonesty A central theme of the judgment is that: Misleading the court in children proceedings can radically alter outcomes . The parties’ conduct had: closed off less interventionist legal routes, necessitated greater state and judicial intervention, and directly contributed to adoption becoming unavoidable. The judge’s description of the case as a “cautionary tale” is directed not only at the parties, but also at others contemplating informal surrogacy arrangements . c. Why adoption was justified The court concluded that: No lawful parental order could now be made. There was no alternative order that could provide J with: secure legal parenthood, stability, and protection from further litigation. Adoption, though drastic, was necessary and proportionate in J’s best interests. The adoption order was therefore made not because adoption was ideal , but because every other route had been rendered unworkable . 5. Key themes and principles The judgment reinforces several important principles: Surrogacy without safeguards carries profound risks Particularly where parties are strangers and arrangements are made online. Honesty with the court is non-negotiable Misleading evidence can fundamentally reshape a child’s legal future. Delay is inimical to welfare The court will not permit procedural confusion to deprive a young child of permanence. Adoption can arise in unexpected contexts Even in surrogacy cases, adoption may become the only lawful solution. 6. Wider significance This case has broader importance for: Practitioners advising on private surrogacy arrangements . Intended parents relying on informal or international conception methods . Courts grappling with the intersection between surrogacy law and adoption law . It sends a clear warning that cutting corners at the outset of surrogacy arrangements may lead to the most intrusive outcome possible . 7. Conclusion Re J (Surrogacy: Adoption Order) [2025] EWHC 2960 (Fam) stands as a stark reminder that child-focused transparency and legal foresight are essential in surrogacy cases. Ms Justice Henke’s judgment makes clear that where adults take risks, mislead the court, or fail to plan lawfully, the consequences may fall irreversibly on the child —and the court will act decisively to secure that child’s welfare. For family law advice and family court representation, contact Stephanie Heijdra family law barrister via sheijdra@winvolvedlegal.co.uk. 

Mr Justice Harrison allowed an appeal in part against the duration of a section 91(14) Children Act 1989 order. 1. Background and procedural context The case arose from exceptionally long-running private law proceedings concerning two children. Over many years, the litigation had become entrenched, adversarial, and damaging to the children’s welfare. In response, the trial judge imposed a section 91(14) order , restricting one parent’s ability to issue further applications without leave of the court. Crucially, the order was made for a very substantial period (effectively indefinite or quasi-indefinite), reflecting the history of repeated applications and the strain placed on both the children and the court system. The appellant did not challenge the making of a s91(14) order in principle, but instead challenged its duration , arguing that it was excessive and unlawful. 2. Legal framework: section 91(14) Children Act 1989 Section 91(14) allows the court to bar further applications without permission where such restriction is necessary to protect the child and/or the other party from harmful or abusive litigation. Well-established principles include: A s91(14) order is exceptional , not routine. It must be proportionate and clearly justified . It should normally be time-limited , with any extension requiring fresh justification. It must not be used as a punitive measure against a parent. The jurisprudence emphasises that the court must balance protection of the child against the fundamental right of access to the court . 3. The appeal: core issue The central issue before the High Court was: Whether the duration of the s91(14) order was lawful, proportionate, and properly reasoned. The appellant accepted the litigation history but argued that the length of the restriction went beyond what was necessary to meet the welfare objectives of the Children Act. 4. Decision of Mr Justice Harrison a. Appeal allowed in part Mr Justice Harrison upheld the need for a section 91(14) order , confirming that: The litigation history plainly justified some restriction . The welfare of the children required protection from further destabilising applications. However, the appeal was allowed in part because of concerns about duration and proportionality . b. Duration was excessive The judge held that: An open-ended or very long s91(14) order risks becoming disproportionate , even in extreme cases. The original judgment did not sufficiently justify why such an extended duration was necessary as opposed to a shorter, reviewable period . Courts must guard against using s91(14) as a de facto permanent bar on a parent’s engagement with the family justice system. The absence of a clear review mechanism or rationale for the chosen timescale was a material error. c. Substitution rather than removal Rather than discharging the order altogether, Mr Justice Harrison: Substituted the duration with a shorter, defined time limit , consistent with existing authority. Emphasised that future applications, if any, could be filtered through the leave requirement , preserving judicial control without unjustified exclusion. This approach maintained child protection while restoring proportionality. 5. Key principles reinforced by the judgment The case restates and strengthens several important points of practice: Duration matters as much as justification Even where a s91(14) order is clearly warranted, its length must be independently reasoned. Indefinite restrictions are rarely lawful Courts must be slow to impose restrictions that effectively exclude a parent for most or all of a child’s minority. Reviewability is critical Time-limited orders respect both welfare concerns and Article 6 / Article 8 rights. Filtering, not punishment Section 91(14) is a gatekeeping mechanism, not a sanction. 6. Practical significance This decision is particularly important for practitioners dealing with: Vexatious or obsessive litigation in private law children cases. Appeals focusing not on whether a s91(14) order should be made, but on how long it should last . Drafting judgments that impose litigation restraints: explicit reasoning on duration is essential . The judgment provides appellate authority for the proposition that even the most extreme litigation histories do not justify abandoning proportionality . 7. Conclusion Re A and T (Children) [2025] EWHC 3052 (Fam) confirms that section 91(14) orders remain a vital protective tool, but one that must be used with precision . Mr Justice Harrison’s partial allowance of the appeal underscores a clear message: The longer the restriction, the stronger and clearer the justification must be.  Stephanie Heijdra is a highly experienced Family Law Barrister, with a background in Complex Financial Disputes and Children Related Disputes. For family court representation and family law legal advice contact Stephanie via sheijdra@winvolvedlegal.co.uk

An analysis of The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v LR & Anor [2025] EWFC 271 (B) , a significant decision on avoidance of disposition in the context of child maintenance enforcement . Procedural Background  Applicant: Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (SSWP), acting on behalf of the Child Maintenance Service (CMS) Respondents: LR – the non-resident parent liable to pay child maintenance PT – the recipient of the property transfer The application was brought under section 32L Child Support Act 1991 , which allows the court to set aside a disposition of property where it is made with the intention of defeating the enforcement of child maintenance liabilities. Factual Background LR had accrued substantial child maintenance arrears assessed by the CMS. Following the accrual (or at least in the context) of those arrears, LR transferred an interest in property to PT. The CMS alleged that: The transfer had the effect of reducing LR’s assets available for enforcement; and The intention behind the transfer was to defeat or prejudice CMS enforcement action . PT resisted the application, arguing the transfer was: Legitimate; Made for proper reasons; and Not intended to defeat maintenance obligations. Legal Framework Section 32L Child Support Act 1991 This provision mirrors (but is distinct from) s.37 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and allows the court to: Set aside a disposition if: The disposition has the effect of defeating enforcement of child maintenance; and The disposition was made with the intention of doing so. Key features of s.32L: The court may infer intention from timing and circumstances . Transfers to connected persons attract particular scrutiny. The burden shifts once CMS shows a prima facie case of avoidance. Issues for Determination The court had to determine: Whether the transfer was a “disposition” within the meaning of s.32L; Whether the transfer had the effect of defeating or reducing the CMS’s ability to enforce arrears; Whether LR had the requisite intention to defeat enforcement; and If so, whether the court should exercise its discretion to set the transfer aside. Court’s Analysis & Reasoning (a) Effect of the Transfer The court found that the property transfer significantly reduced LR’s enforceable asset base . As a result, CMS enforcement options (charging orders, sale, etc.) were materially weakened. This satisfied the “effect” limb of s.32L. (b) Intention to Defeat Enforcement The judge emphasised that direct evidence of intention is rarely available . Intention can be inferred from: The timing of the transfer; LR’s knowledge of CMS arrears and enforcement powers ; The absence of convincing alternative explanations; and The relationship between LR and PT. The court concluded that the only realistic inference was that the transfer was designed to place the property beyond the reach of CMS. (c) Respondents’ Explanations The explanations advanced by LR and PT were found to be inconsistent, unsupported, or implausible . The court rejected the argument that the transfer was part of ordinary financial or family arrangements. (d) Discretion Given the statutory purpose of the Child Support Act — protecting children’s financial support — the court held that discretion should be exercised robustly in favour of CMS. Outcome The court set aside the property transfer under s.32L Child Support Act 1991 . The property was treated as if the disposition had not occurred , allowing CMS to pursue enforcement against it. The decision restored CMS’s ability to seek: Charging orders Orders for sale Other enforcement remedies Significance of the Decision (a) Strong Enforcement Message The case reinforces that: CMS has powerful tools to challenge asset-shielding behaviour; Attempts to defeat child maintenance obligations will be scrutinised closely. (b) Parallels with Matrimonial Finance The reasoning closely mirrors s.37 MCA 1973 cases: Substance over form Inference of intention Focus on practical effect Practitioners can draw analogies between financial remedy avoidance cases and CMS enforcement proceedings . (c) Connected Persons at Risk Transfers to partners, relatives, or close associates are particularly vulnerable to challenge where arrears exist. (d) Policy Emphasis The judgment underscores that child maintenance is not an optional debt — it enjoys strong statutory protection. Practical Take-Aways for Practitioners For CMS / SSWP: Gather clear evidence of: Timing of arrears vs transfer Knowledge of liability Lack of consideration Inference of intention is sufficient — direct proof is not required. For Respondents: Legitimate transfers must be: Properly documented Supported by clear consideration Capable of explanation independent of enforcement risk Weak or post-hoc justifications are unlikely to succeed. For Advisers: Warn clients that asset transfers after CMS involvement are high risk . Consider early negotiation or payment plans rather than attempting asset re-structuring. Concluding Observation SSWP v LR & Anor [2025] EWFC 271 (B) is an important reminder that the Family Court will take a robust, child-focused approach to enforcement. Where property is moved to avoid child maintenance, the court will not hesitate to unwind the transaction to protect the child’s entitlement. For family law advice and family court representation, contact Stephanie Heijdra public access family barrister via sheijdra@winvolvedlegal.co.uk

A detailed analysis of Re D (Threshold Findings and Final Orders at IRH) [2025] EWCA Civ 1362 — a recent and important Court of Appeal decision reshaping how care-proceedings thresholds must be handled. Summary & Facts The appeal concerned a decision made at an Issues Resolution Hearing (“IRH”) by the lower court — care and placement orders were granted under s. 31 Children Act 1989, after the parents did not respond to the local authority’s threshold statement. At first instance, judgment was very brief (just over two pages), made in the absence of the parents, and simply stated the judge was “satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the threshold is met.” There was no detailed fact-finding, no link in the written judgment between alleged facts and statutory threshold grounds, and no elaboration showing how evidence satisfied the criteria for “significant harm / risk of harm.” The court’s order included a “standard-form” provision: if parents failed to respond to the threshold allegations by a date, they would be “deemed to accept” the threshold. Legal Issues & Court of Appeal’s Key Findings The Court of Appeal (Baker LJ, Cobb LJ, Miles LJ) allowed the appeal, annulled the care and placement orders, substituted an interim care order, and remitted the case for fresh case-management. Key issues and findings: 1. Judicial Duty to Independently Assess Threshold Section 31(2) CA 1989 obliges the court — not the parties — to satisfy itself that threshold criteria are met before making care/placement orders. That requires a judge to make clear findings of fact and link them to statutory grounds. The mere fact of non-response or absence cannot substitute for proof. 2. Rejection of “Deemed Acceptance” Mechanism The practice (endorsed in Standard Form Orders) of treating parental silence or non-response as “deemed acceptance” of threshold allegations was struck down as inappropriate. Cobb LJ warned that such practice risks converting threshold determination into an “administrative” rather than judicial act — undermining procedural fairness, burden of proof, and the court’s independent evaluative role. 3. Inadequacy of Reasoning for Life-Altering Orders Even when proceedings are uncontested or parties absent, a judge must still give reasons — not minimal or perfunctory statements — when making removals/care/placement orders. The lower court’s failure to do so was “wholly deficient” and undermined confidence in the decision’s fairness. 4. Risk in Rushing Finality at IRH The decision casts serious doubt on the use of IRHs as final hearings, where there has been little or no engagement by parents, and where evidence has not been robustly tested. The court emphasized that delays alone do not justify summary disposal without proper fact-finding. Significance — Why This Case Matters It reaffirms the role of the court (not procedural default or parental silence) in deciding threshold — safeguarding Article 8 rights and procedural fairness. It invalidates a common “standard-form” shortcut : “deemed acceptance” clauses should no longer be relied on to impose care orders without proper scrutiny. It raises the bar for IRHs : practitioners must expect detailed fact-finding, even where a case seems uncontested. Pushing for finality at IRH will likely be harder. It delivers strong guidance to practitioners : threshold documents must clearly plead facts, link them to statutory grounds, and avoid vague “report of” language untested by evidence. It restores importance of individual justice over administrative convenience — even in overloaded public-law lists. Practical Takeaways for Practitioners For Local Authorities and Guardians: Do not assume silent non-response = “win.” Prepare full, evidence-based threshold statements clearly linking facts to statutory grounds. Be ready to present evidence and expect thorough judicial scrutiny, even in uncontested cases. For Respondent Parents: Absence or failure to respond does not automatically lead to care orders — challenge any “deemed acceptance” or bare findings. If possible, engage in the process — even minimal engagement may force careful fact-finding rather than summary order.  For Practitioners Advising Early — e.g. in pre-proceedings or on drafting: Ensure threshold documents are robust. Avoid generic language. Warn clients about consequences of non-response — but also the risk that “default” may be challenged under Re D. When instructing, prepare skeleton arguments urging thorough judicial evaluation, especially where parties are absent/unrepresented. Limitations & Context This is not a wholesale ban on IRH-final orders — but strong warning: IRH may be used only with full judicial rigour . Where evidence is overwhelming and parents have fair opportunity to respond, a well-reasoned IRH final order may still be legitimate. The decision does not change underlying statutory test — threshold remains high; the difference is in how rigorously the test is applied . For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra Direct Access Family Barrister via sheijdra@winvolvedlegal.co.uk

Analysis of C v S [2025] EWFC 254 — a costs-only judgment in private law children proceedings under the Children Act 1989 (CA). Facts & Procedural Background The case concerned two children, X and Z, of which C (“M”) is the mother and S (“F”) is the father. The substantive hearing took place on 13 May 2024; the main judgment was delivered on 13 August 2024, although core findings were notified earlier (3 June 2024). The costs judgment was issued by Dexter Dias KC (sitting as a Section 9 judge) and is directed purely to the costs application arising out of the earlier proceedings. The father claimed costs of about £169,415.65 , later revised down to £123,825.43 for the formal application. The mother counter-argued the figures were exaggerated. The case was described as a “prolonged, deeply acrimonious” private children dispute, with litigation over many years. Legal Issues Issue 1: Costs in principle Whether an award of costs is justified in private children proceedings under the Children Act 1989. The starting point: general practice in CA proceedings is not to make costs orders against parties, but there is a discretion to do so in “exceptional circumstances” — including where a party has behaved unreasonably or vexatiously. The judge considered whether M’s conduct justified departing from the usual position. The judge noted “grave reservations” about M’s awareness of contact suspensions and failure to engage constructively with ADR. Issue 2: Proportion / Amount If costs are ordered, what proportion of the claim is reasonable and what factors should adjust the figure (e.g., ability to pay, the impact on children, contributions of parties). Evidence of conduct, whether ADR was attempted, duplicative hearings, length of litigation, and the welfare of the children all weighed in assessing amount. Judgment & Reasoning The judgment reaffirmed that although the default is no costs order in private children cases, the court retained discretion to make one where there has been reprehensible or unreasonable behaviour . On the facts: The judge found that M had engaged in repeated litigation, had missed opportunities for ADR, and had not engaged constructively. The father’s conduct was comparatively more constructive. On the amount: The amount claimed by the father was adjusted downward, reflecting excessive claimed costs, and the court scrutinised each component of the claim (hearings with no costs order originally, duplicated work). On ability to pay and impact: The judge also emphasised that a costs order should not undermine the children’s welfare (e.g., if the paying parent is the primary carer). The disposal section: The judge ordered a costs award in favour of the father, but sized & phased in a way considered proportionate given the context of children’s proceedings. (Exact figure and payment terms are in the judgment.) Significance & Practical Take-aways Key message : Even in private law children proceedings, costs orders can be made — the default “no costs” is not absolute. Conduct matters hugely: litigants must engage with ADR, avoid unnecessary hearings, cooperate with processes and not use litigation as a tactical weapon. Early settlement / ADR is strongly encouraged — failure to make good use of it can count heavily against you in costs. Practitioners should always evaluate, at an early stage, the risks of a costs application in children proceedings if the other side may argue unreasonable behaviour. It emphasises the balancing act: the welfare of the children remains central, so orders should not jeopardise children’s needs or stability. The judgement may serve as a warning to “serial” children proceedings litigants: continued contestation and failure to resolve issues bears costs risks. Limitations & Considerations The case is very fact-specific: long history of contested litigation, findings of untruthful or obstructive behaviour on the mother’s part — results may differ in more modest or less conflicted cases. The judgment addresses costs only, not the substantive child arrangements decisions — so it is primarily a costs precedent, not substantive children law. As with all discretion-based costs orders, the outcome depends heavily on the judge’s view of each party’s conduct, the litigation history, and the welfare context. For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra direct access family barrister via 02071014682 and sheijdra@winvolvedlegal.co.uk

Here is a detailed analysis of BM v MB v GM v X (2025) EWFC 129 , a key Financial Remedies case dealing with asset transfers, identification of marital property and avoidance of disposition orders. Facts & Procedure The case involved a long marriage, with significant wealth: a family business (valued at approx. £20.26 m) and substantial landholdings adjacent to the family home. The husband (H) had transferred approximately 25% of his shareholding in the family company into a trust (for the children) and had also transferred two (or three) parcels of land to an LLP or similar vehicle. The wife (W) applied under s 37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to set aside the transfers, arguing they were made to defeat her financial claims. The court had to determine: (a) whether the transfers should be set aside, (b) the valuation and classification of assets (marital vs non-marital), and (c) the appropriate remedy (lump sum, pension share etc). The hearing ran for a substantive period with expert valuations of the business, land and trust interests. Key Legal Issues Avoidance of Disposition (s 37 MCA 1973) The statutory test: whether the disposition(s) had the effect of defeating or reducing the party’s claim, whether they were made with that intent, and whether the court should exercise its discretion to set them aside. Whether the transfers to the trust/LLP were part of estate planning/tax planning or were deliberately structured to frustrate the wife’s claim. How to treat third-party arrangements (trust, LLP) where husband retains beneficial control. Identification and Valuation of Marital Assets What counts as martial/acquired assets: the business, uplift, land, trust interests. Apportioning between marital and non-marital: e.g., inherited or pre-marital shares vs marital growth. Use of appropriate valuation methods: whether discounts for minorities, illiquidity, or long-term ownership apply. The role of the sharing principle under s 25(2)(a) MCA 1973 and how the court should exercise discretion once the asset base is identified. Remedy and Exercise of Discretion Once assets are identified, how the court determines lump sum, pension sharing, pension offset, capitalisation of maintenance, etc. Costs consequences: conduct of parties, negotiation behaviour, use of expert evidence. Judgment & Reasoning The court set aside the impugned transfers of shares and land under s 37 because it found: the effect of the transfers was to reduce the wife’s claim; the transfers were made with the requisite intention to defeat the claim; and discretion should be exercised to set them aside. On valuation: The court rejected significant discounts (for minority holdings, illiquidity) because the evidence did not support them, noting the business could only realistically be sold by the shareholders together. On the identification of marital assets: The court applied an “intuitive approach” (per Robertson v Robertson (2016) EWCA Civ 1866) rather than a strict formulaic percentage deduction, due to lack of historical accounting evidence. On matrimonialisation: The court emphasised that inherited shares might be ring-fenced, but uplift attributable to marital endeavour is shared. The court did not require a separate enquiry into special contributions unless specifically raised. On remedy: The husband was ordered to pay a lump sum of approximately £5.37 million to the wife, the wife to transfer her shareholding back, the husband to discharge the wife's director loan account, and a pension share of 16% awarded. On costs: The wife was sanctioned in costs for failure to negotiate openly, despite the husband’s asset transfer misconduct. The husband paid the costs of the s37 application. Significance & Practical Take-aways This judgment is a strong anti-avoidance message : transfers made near (or during) proceedings, to family trusts/LLPs, with effect of defeating claims, will be set aside. It demonstrates that beneficial ownership and substance matter more than form (trust/LLP structures will not immunise assets from sharing). Valuation: It reinforces that courts will not automatically apply discounts without evidence, especially where the assets are held by a controlling interest. The use of the intuitive apportionment approach under Robertson is reaffirmed — useful where historical breakdown data is missing. On matrimonialisation: Even inherited assets if significantly enhanced during marriage may attract sharing. On costs and conduct: Both parties’ conduct matters. Failure to negotiate reasonably can lead to cost sanctions even if one party engaged in asset diversion. Practical advice: Early forensic asset tracing, consideration of s 37 risk in financial remedy cases, and early estimation of the asset base are crucial. Limitations / Considerations Fact-sensitive outcome: The extent of the transfers, business valuation scale, and evidence of intention make this case specific. Other cases with less stark features may lead to different outcomes. Not a binding precedent at appellate level — Recorder’s decision under Financial Remedies Court, albeit persuasive. The intuitive apportionment, while practical, leaves some uncertainty for parties who prefer formulaic clarity. Complexity and cost: Such high-value cases demand expensive expert evidence and lengthy hearings. The conduct of both sides and negotiation early may be determinative. If you are looking for a divorce lawyer for matrimonial finance, please contact Stephanie Heijdra via sheijdra@winvolvedlegal.co.uk. For Family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra direct access family barrister via sheijdra@winvolvedlegal.co.uk or 02071014682