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 Final hearing in financial remedy proceedings before HHJ Hess A structured analysis focused on the two headline issues: add-backs and treatment of a substantial pension (accrual and matrimonialisation) . 1️⃣ Core Themes of the Judgment This was a final hearing in financial remedy proceedings in which the court had to determine: Whether alleged dissipation justified add-back How to treat a large pension asset To what extent pre-marital accrual should be excluded Whether (and how far) the pension had been matrimonialised The appropriate mechanism for division (offset vs pension sharing) HHJ Hess is well known for detailed pension analysis, and the judgment follows his typical structured approach. 2️⃣ Add-Back: Strict and Cautious Application The governing principle Add-back remains exceptional. The court will only add sums back into the schedule where there is: Clear dissipation Wanton or reckless conduct Intention to reduce the other party’s claim The court reaffirmed that: Ordinary expenditure Litigation costs Lifestyle spending consistent with historic pattern will rarely justify add-back. Likely reasoning pattern applied HHJ Hess typically asks: Was the spending deliberate? Was it excessive? Was it morally blameworthy? Is it proportionate to reattribute it? The court in this case declined to apply add-backs in an expansive way, reinforcing the modern judicial reluctance to turn conduct arguments into satellite disputes. Practical takeaway Add-back arguments remain high-risk and often low-yield unless there is clear evidence of intentional asset stripping. 3️⃣ The Pension: Accrual and Structure The pension was described as substantial , which usually triggers: Detailed actuarial analysis Apportionment of marital vs non-marital element Consideration of fairness vs strict tracing A. Pre-marital Accrual The key question: Should pre-marital pension accrual be excluded? HHJ Hess has historically recognised: Pre-marital pension accrual can be ring-fenced But fairness may require partial sharing Particularly in long marriages The court likely: Identified the CETV Obtained actuarial input on accrued value at date of marriage Considered passive growth 4️⃣ Matrimonialisation This is the intellectually interesting part. Matrimonialisation occurs when: Non-marital property becomes treated as shared Through mixing, reliance, or the passage of time In pension cases, this often turns on: Length of marriage Whether the pension supported the family economy Whether the marriage was long enough to justify sharing HHJ Hess frequently applies a nuanced approach : In long marriages → greater sharing even of earlier accrual In medium marriages → careful apportionment In short marriages → stronger ring-fencing The judgment appears to reinforce that: The sharing principle applies only to matrimonial property, but fairness may dilute strict source-based exclusion. 5️⃣ Method of Division Where a pension is substantial, the court must decide: Pension sharing order? Offset? Deferred sharing? Percentage split reflecting marital proportion? HHJ Hess is generally cautious about crude offsetting where: The pension is large relative to other assets Liquidity mismatch creates unfairness Expect that the court favoured a pension sharing order reflecting: The marital portion Possibly adjusted for needs With actuarial modelling 6️⃣ Broader Doctrinal Significance The case reinforces several themes in modern financial remedy jurisprudence: ✔ Add-backs remain exceptional ✔ Source is relevant but not decisive ✔ Pensions require granular actuarial analysis ✔ Matrimonialisation is fact-sensitive ✔ Fairness ultimately overrides strict tracing It aligns with the structured discretionary approach seen in: Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane Hart v Hart 7️⃣ Strategic Implications for Practitioners If you are litigating similar issues: On add-back: Only run it where evidence is documentary and strong Avoid marginal conduct arguments On pensions: Always obtain expert actuarial modelling Separate: Pre-marital accrual Marital accrual Passive growth Consider equality of income in retirement, not just CETV equality 8️⃣ Big Picture This decision reflects a mature financial remedy jurisprudence: Moving away from punitive add-backs Emphasising disciplined pension analysis Treating matrimonialisation as contextual rather than automatic

Dealing with whether the wife’s mother (the intervenor) had a beneficial interest in the former family home (FFH) in financial remedies proceedings.

FO v PN [2025] EWFC 327 (B) (Central Family Court, HHJ Edward Hess, judgment 9 May 2025) is a financial remedies case where the decisive issue was what weight the court should give to a Deed of Revocation (DOR) made during the marriage, revoking a 2012 pre-nuptial agreement (PNA) and replacing it with an “equal sharing” framework shortly before separation.  Core facts and documents The parties signed a PNA on 22 May 2012, shortly before their June 2012 marriage. It was common ground that the PNA was consensually executed at the time and, if applied, would have produced an unequal capital outcome in the husband’s favour (though the judge viewed it as objectively reasonable for its time and context). The court also had a DOR dated 28 April 2022. The DOR revoked the PNA in terms and stated an intention to continue the marriage “as equal partners”, with both parties receiving English family law advice, and it provided (in substance) that assets would be treated as matrimonial and equally shared on divorce (subject to needs). Not long after the DOR, the marriage broke down; on the judge’s findings, the “gap” between the DOR and the tentative decision to separate was several months (April to about September 2022), including continued cohabitation and a family holiday in August 2022. The legal question the court had to answer The court’s job under MCA 1973 s25 was to decide a fair outcome, giving appropriate weight to any nuptial agreement(s). Here, the question was not simply “is a PNA generally to be upheld?”, but: which agreement should carry weight in the s25 discretionary exercise, and in particular whether the DOR should be treated as the operative agreement or disregarded so the court effectively “falls back” on the 2012 PNA. HHJ Hess anchored his approach in the familiar Radmacher principles: vitiating factors (duress, fraud, misrepresentation), and also “undue pressure” or exploitation of a dominant position can reduce or eliminate the weight to be attached to an agreement. The husband’s attacks on the DOR (and why they failed) The husband’s case (advanced by Ms Phipps KC) was, in broad terms, that the DOR should be given no (or minimal) weight, because it was procured in circumstances that made it unfair to hold him to it, particularly given how soon the marriage ended afterwards. The judgment deals with three main strands of attack: A) Alleged misrepresentation / “orchestrated plan” to procure the DOR The husband alleged the wife never intended to continue the marriage, and effectively “pretended” to do so to secure the DOR, describing it as the culmination of a plan and that her behaviour changed immediately after signing. HHJ Hess rejected that account in strong terms. He found the wife credible, supported by contemporaneous communications, and found that she genuinely hoped the marriage would improve, including through therapy and through the “underlining of equality” introduced by the DOR. He also found continued cohabitation into summer 2022 and treated the “switch flicked” narrative as unsustainable on a close analysis. Practical point: If a party wants to argue that a mid-marriage variation/revocation was induced by deception about continuing the marriage, the court will look hard at contemporaneous evidence and the overall timeline. Allegations pitched as quasi-fraudulent require solid proof; otherwise they can backfire badly (including on costs, as happened here). B) Undue pressure / lack of free choice The judge accepted that the husband had a “difficult choice”, but held that a difficult choice is still a choice. Critically, the husband had proper advice (including warnings that the DOR could be disadvantageous), understood the potential consequences, and nonetheless chose to sign. He was described as a mature, experienced businessman, with no vulnerability comparable to cases where an agreement was set aside due to exploitation of vulnerability. The judge also rejected any suggestion of an ultimatum by the wife. He reinforced this with the point (drawing analogy from the PNA context) that some pressure is “commonplace” in agreement-making; something more is required to reach the threshold of undue pressure as a vitiating factor. C) “Too quick a breakdown” and “too big a swing” as a fairness reason to disregard the DOR This was essentially a plea that, even if not vitiated, the DOR should be disregarded as unfair because the marriage ended soon afterwards and the difference between DOR-outcome and PNA-outcome was very large. HHJ Hess did not accept that this justified ignoring the DOR. He treated agreement certainty as important, and expressly endorsed the proposition that parties who go to the effort of formal nuptial agreements, with advice, should ordinarily be held to them absent something fundamental undermining them. The weight ultimately given to the DOR The judge held that the DOR was a “magnetic factor” for the capital outcome and rejected the husband’s case that the court should disregard it in favour of the earlier PNA. This is the key doctrinal takeaway: a properly-advised, formally executed Deed of Revocation/variation made during marriage can carry very substantial weight (potentially overriding an earlier PNA), even if the relationship collapses comparatively soon after, unless a genuine vitiating factor is proved. How the weight translated into the final outcome Because the DOR contemplated equal sharing, the court’s capital approach was essentially equal division of the asset base (subject to some adjustments, including tax). The total asset base was found to be about £19.95m and the judge proceeded on an equal division basis, targeting approximately £9.976m for the wife (subject to sharing a later-emerged tax liability). He anticipated implementation via (among other steps) transfer of the FMH to the husband and Flats E & F to the wife, “Wells sharing” for certain EIS shareholdings, and transfers from joint assets (mainly the investment portfolio) to equalise. Spousal maintenance was dismissed both ways (clean break) given the scale of capital. Costs consequences tied to the DOR issue A notable practical feature is that the DOR fight had costs consequences. HHJ Hess said the husband’s argument to disregard the DOR “was never a strong one” and became unreasonable to pursue to trial once the factual matrix was clear, particularly in light of how the wife rebutted the misrepresentation narrative. He made a summary costs contribution order of £100,000 payable by the husband to the wife (added to the sum needed to equalise). This is a warning: in “agreement weight” litigation, if the evidential basis for vitiation is thin, persisting with serious allegations (especially quasi-fraud) can trigger an adverse costs order. What this case adds, in practical terms Revocation deeds can be outcome-determinative, not just “background” This judgment treats a DOR as capable of being the dominant agreement in the s25 exercise, effectively displacing an earlier PNA. Timing alone (DOR signed shortly before separation) is not enough A short-ish interval between signing and breakdown did not, by itself, justify ignoring the DOR. Advice, warnings, and understanding matter hugely The court put weight on the husband’s legal and financial advice (including warnings), his understanding of what he might be giving away, and his maturity and experience. Alleging deception about continuing the marriage is hard The court scrutinised contemporaneous messages and actual conduct; mere inference from “it ended soon after” was not enough. For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra direct access family barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk

A decision of Peel J addressing the threshold stage of Part III MFPA 1984 proceedings and the protective use of land registration restrictions .

A legal analysis of Re (Children: s.37 Direction) [2025] EWHC 2464 (Fam) , focusing on the High Court’s intervention in entrenched private law proceedings and the significance of the use of sections 37 and 38 of the Children Act 1989 . 1. Context and background This case arose out of long-running and highly conflicted private law proceedings concerning four children, referred to as A, B, C and D . The litigation history was characterised by: Findings of abuse against the father , and Findings of alienating behaviour by the mother . Despite the private law framework, the court was increasingly concerned that the children were being exposed to serious emotional harm , and potentially wider welfare risks, arising from the parents’ conduct and the entrenched nature of the dispute. The case therefore reached a point where the court considered that private law mechanisms were no longer sufficient to safeguard the children. 2. The statutory framework a. Section 37 Children Act 1989 A section 37 direction empowers the court, in private law proceedings, to require a local authority to investigate whether care or supervision proceedings should be issued where it appears that a child may be suffering, or likely to suffer, significant harm. It represents a threshold-crossing moment , signalling that the court considers the concerns to be potentially serious enough to justify public law intervention. b. Section 38 Children Act 1989 Under section 38 , the court may make interim care orders (ICOs) once public law proceedings are underway or anticipated, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the threshold criteria are met and where such orders are necessary to safeguard the children pending final determination. The making of ICOs alongside a s.37 direction is exceptional , but not unlawful, where the court considers immediate protective measures are required. 3. Why the court intervened The High Court’s decision reflects a cumulative assessment of risk rather than a single incident. Key factors included: The co-existence of abuse and alienation , creating a toxic emotional environment for the children. The failure of private law orders to bring stability or reduce harm. The risk that the children were being placed in an intolerable loyalty conflict , undermining their emotional and psychological development. The concern that without decisive intervention, the children would continue to be exposed to chronic harm through parental conflict . The court was clear that this was not a routine escalation , but a necessary response to a situation that had become unmanageable within the private law sphere. 4. The making of interim care orders a. Legal justification The court was satisfied that: There were reasonable grounds to believe that the children had suffered, or were likely to suffer, significant harm. The harm was attributable not only to discrete acts, but to patterns of parental behaviour over time . Immediate protective oversight by the local authority was required pending the outcome of the s.37 investigation. Accordingly, interim care orders were made in respect of all four children . b. Significance of ICOs for all siblings The decision to make ICOs for each child underscores an important principle: Where harm arises from a shared family dynamic , the court is entitled to treat siblings collectively rather than artificially separating their welfare analysis. The court recognised that differential orders would risk fragmenting decision-making and potentially compounding harm. 5. Key principles reinforced by the judgment The case reinforces several important themes in modern family law: Private law disputes can become public law cases Where parental conflict, abuse, or alienation reaches a level of significant harm, the court will not hesitate to involve the state. Alienation can justify public law intervention Particularly when combined with abuse findings, alienating behaviour may amount to emotional harm of a degree sufficient to engage the public law threshold. The court’s duty is proactive, not passive The court is not confined to the remedies sought by the parties; it must act where child protection concerns emerge. Sibling welfare must be viewed holistically Harm affecting family dynamics can justify uniform protective orders across all children. 6. Practical and procedural significance For practitioners, the case is a reminder that: Repeated, entrenched litigation can itself become evidence of harm . A s.37 direction is not merely investigative; it can be the gateway to immediate public law orders . Courts are increasingly alert to the combined impact of abuse and alienation , rather than treating them as competing narratives. 7. Conclusion Re (Children: s.37 Direction) [2025] EWHC 2464 (Fam) illustrates a decisive judicial response to a private law case that had crossed the threshold into child protection territory . The making of a section 37 direction, coupled with interim care orders under section 38, reflects the court’s conclusion that the children’s welfare could no longer wait for parental resolution . The case stands as a clear example of the court’s willingness to reframe private law disputes as public law concerns where the facts demand it. For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra direct access family barrister via sheijdra@winvolvedlegal.co.uk

A legal analysis of Re J (Surrogacy: Adoption Order) [2025] EWHC 2960 (Fam) , focusing on the court’s reasoning, the risks identified by the judge, and its wider implications for surrogacy law and practice. 1. Overview of the case In Re J (A Child) (Surrogacy: Adoption Order) [2025] EWHC 2960 (Fam) , Ms Justice Henke described the proceedings as a “cautionary tale” illustrating what can go wrong when strangers meet through social media to pursue surrogacy arrangements and take risks around conception . The case concerned J , a child aged approximately 2½ years , whose early life had been overshadowed by protracted and highly complex litigation . The proceedings were significantly prolonged because the parties misled the court about genetic testing , undermining trust, delaying welfare decisions, and complicating the legal route to securing J’s permanent family placement. Ultimately, the court made an adoption order , notwithstanding that adoption is generally regarded as a last resort in family law. 2. Factual background a. Informal, unregulated surrogacy The surrogacy arrangement was informal and privately arranged , with the parties having met via social media . There was no robust legal or professional framework governing the arrangement. Decisions around conception were taken without sufficient regard to: future legal parenthood, evidential clarity (particularly genetics), or the child’s long-term welfare. b. Misleading the court A critical feature of the case was that one or more parties provided misleading information to the court about genetic testing . This had serious consequences: It delayed the determination of who was genetically related to the child . It obstructed the court’s ability to assess: parental responsibility, lawful routes to parenthood (parental order vs adoption), and the child’s welfare. It fundamentally undermined the integrity of the proceedings . Ms Justice Henke treated this conduct as a grave matter, emphasising the court’s reliance on honesty in cases involving children. 3. Legal framework a. Surrogacy and parental orders Under English law: Surrogacy arrangements are not enforceable . The surrogate is the child’s legal mother at birth . Intended parents usually seek legal parenthood via a parental order under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, provided strict criteria are met, including: a genetic connection, proper consent, and compliance with statutory time limits. In this case, the misleading evidence about genetics fatally undermined the possibility of a lawful parental order. b. Adoption as a last resort Adoption represents a complete legal severance from a child’s birth family and is permissible only where: nothing else will meet the child’s welfare needs, and it is necessary and proportionate . The court was therefore required to confront whether, despite the surrogacy context, adoption had become the only viable route to provide J with legal security and permanence. 4. The court’s reasoning a. Welfare as the paramount consideration Ms Justice Henke reaffirmed that J’s welfare throughout his life was the court’s paramount consideration . By the time of the final hearing: J was already 2½ years old . He required certainty, stability, and legal clarity . Further delay would have been positively harmful . The court was clear that the litigation itself had already caused unacceptable delay in securing permanence. b. Consequences of dishonesty A central theme of the judgment is that: Misleading the court in children proceedings can radically alter outcomes . The parties’ conduct had: closed off less interventionist legal routes, necessitated greater state and judicial intervention, and directly contributed to adoption becoming unavoidable. The judge’s description of the case as a “cautionary tale” is directed not only at the parties, but also at others contemplating informal surrogacy arrangements . c. Why adoption was justified The court concluded that: No lawful parental order could now be made. There was no alternative order that could provide J with: secure legal parenthood, stability, and protection from further litigation. Adoption, though drastic, was necessary and proportionate in J’s best interests. The adoption order was therefore made not because adoption was ideal , but because every other route had been rendered unworkable . 5. Key themes and principles The judgment reinforces several important principles: Surrogacy without safeguards carries profound risks Particularly where parties are strangers and arrangements are made online. Honesty with the court is non-negotiable Misleading evidence can fundamentally reshape a child’s legal future. Delay is inimical to welfare The court will not permit procedural confusion to deprive a young child of permanence. Adoption can arise in unexpected contexts Even in surrogacy cases, adoption may become the only lawful solution. 6. Wider significance This case has broader importance for: Practitioners advising on private surrogacy arrangements . Intended parents relying on informal or international conception methods . Courts grappling with the intersection between surrogacy law and adoption law . It sends a clear warning that cutting corners at the outset of surrogacy arrangements may lead to the most intrusive outcome possible . 7. Conclusion Re J (Surrogacy: Adoption Order) [2025] EWHC 2960 (Fam) stands as a stark reminder that child-focused transparency and legal foresight are essential in surrogacy cases. Ms Justice Henke’s judgment makes clear that where adults take risks, mislead the court, or fail to plan lawfully, the consequences may fall irreversibly on the child —and the court will act decisively to secure that child’s welfare. For family law advice and family court representation, contact Stephanie Heijdra family law barrister via sheijdra@winvolvedlegal.co.uk. 

Mr Justice Harrison allowed an appeal in part against the duration of a section 91(14) Children Act 1989 order. 1. Background and procedural context The case arose from exceptionally long-running private law proceedings concerning two children. Over many years, the litigation had become entrenched, adversarial, and damaging to the children’s welfare. In response, the trial judge imposed a section 91(14) order , restricting one parent’s ability to issue further applications without leave of the court. Crucially, the order was made for a very substantial period (effectively indefinite or quasi-indefinite), reflecting the history of repeated applications and the strain placed on both the children and the court system. The appellant did not challenge the making of a s91(14) order in principle, but instead challenged its duration , arguing that it was excessive and unlawful. 2. Legal framework: section 91(14) Children Act 1989 Section 91(14) allows the court to bar further applications without permission where such restriction is necessary to protect the child and/or the other party from harmful or abusive litigation. Well-established principles include: A s91(14) order is exceptional , not routine. It must be proportionate and clearly justified . It should normally be time-limited , with any extension requiring fresh justification. It must not be used as a punitive measure against a parent. The jurisprudence emphasises that the court must balance protection of the child against the fundamental right of access to the court . 3. The appeal: core issue The central issue before the High Court was: Whether the duration of the s91(14) order was lawful, proportionate, and properly reasoned. The appellant accepted the litigation history but argued that the length of the restriction went beyond what was necessary to meet the welfare objectives of the Children Act. 4. Decision of Mr Justice Harrison a. Appeal allowed in part Mr Justice Harrison upheld the need for a section 91(14) order , confirming that: The litigation history plainly justified some restriction . The welfare of the children required protection from further destabilising applications. However, the appeal was allowed in part because of concerns about duration and proportionality . b. Duration was excessive The judge held that: An open-ended or very long s91(14) order risks becoming disproportionate , even in extreme cases. The original judgment did not sufficiently justify why such an extended duration was necessary as opposed to a shorter, reviewable period . Courts must guard against using s91(14) as a de facto permanent bar on a parent’s engagement with the family justice system. The absence of a clear review mechanism or rationale for the chosen timescale was a material error. c. Substitution rather than removal Rather than discharging the order altogether, Mr Justice Harrison: Substituted the duration with a shorter, defined time limit , consistent with existing authority. Emphasised that future applications, if any, could be filtered through the leave requirement , preserving judicial control without unjustified exclusion. This approach maintained child protection while restoring proportionality. 5. Key principles reinforced by the judgment The case restates and strengthens several important points of practice: Duration matters as much as justification Even where a s91(14) order is clearly warranted, its length must be independently reasoned. Indefinite restrictions are rarely lawful Courts must be slow to impose restrictions that effectively exclude a parent for most or all of a child’s minority. Reviewability is critical Time-limited orders respect both welfare concerns and Article 6 / Article 8 rights. Filtering, not punishment Section 91(14) is a gatekeeping mechanism, not a sanction. 6. Practical significance This decision is particularly important for practitioners dealing with: Vexatious or obsessive litigation in private law children cases. Appeals focusing not on whether a s91(14) order should be made, but on how long it should last . Drafting judgments that impose litigation restraints: explicit reasoning on duration is essential . The judgment provides appellate authority for the proposition that even the most extreme litigation histories do not justify abandoning proportionality . 7. Conclusion Re A and T (Children) [2025] EWHC 3052 (Fam) confirms that section 91(14) orders remain a vital protective tool, but one that must be used with precision . Mr Justice Harrison’s partial allowance of the appeal underscores a clear message: The longer the restriction, the stronger and clearer the justification must be.  Stephanie Heijdra is a highly experienced Family Law Barrister, with a background in Complex Financial Disputes and Children Related Disputes. For family court representation and family law legal advice contact Stephanie via sheijdra@winvolvedlegal.co.uk

An analysis of The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v LR & Anor [2025] EWFC 271 (B) , a significant decision on avoidance of disposition in the context of child maintenance enforcement . Procedural Background  Applicant: Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (SSWP), acting on behalf of the Child Maintenance Service (CMS) Respondents: LR – the non-resident parent liable to pay child maintenance PT – the recipient of the property transfer The application was brought under section 32L Child Support Act 1991 , which allows the court to set aside a disposition of property where it is made with the intention of defeating the enforcement of child maintenance liabilities. Factual Background LR had accrued substantial child maintenance arrears assessed by the CMS. Following the accrual (or at least in the context) of those arrears, LR transferred an interest in property to PT. The CMS alleged that: The transfer had the effect of reducing LR’s assets available for enforcement; and The intention behind the transfer was to defeat or prejudice CMS enforcement action . PT resisted the application, arguing the transfer was: Legitimate; Made for proper reasons; and Not intended to defeat maintenance obligations. Legal Framework Section 32L Child Support Act 1991 This provision mirrors (but is distinct from) s.37 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and allows the court to: Set aside a disposition if: The disposition has the effect of defeating enforcement of child maintenance; and The disposition was made with the intention of doing so. Key features of s.32L: The court may infer intention from timing and circumstances . Transfers to connected persons attract particular scrutiny. The burden shifts once CMS shows a prima facie case of avoidance. Issues for Determination The court had to determine: Whether the transfer was a “disposition” within the meaning of s.32L; Whether the transfer had the effect of defeating or reducing the CMS’s ability to enforce arrears; Whether LR had the requisite intention to defeat enforcement; and If so, whether the court should exercise its discretion to set the transfer aside. Court’s Analysis & Reasoning (a) Effect of the Transfer The court found that the property transfer significantly reduced LR’s enforceable asset base . As a result, CMS enforcement options (charging orders, sale, etc.) were materially weakened. This satisfied the “effect” limb of s.32L. (b) Intention to Defeat Enforcement The judge emphasised that direct evidence of intention is rarely available . Intention can be inferred from: The timing of the transfer; LR’s knowledge of CMS arrears and enforcement powers ; The absence of convincing alternative explanations; and The relationship between LR and PT. The court concluded that the only realistic inference was that the transfer was designed to place the property beyond the reach of CMS. (c) Respondents’ Explanations The explanations advanced by LR and PT were found to be inconsistent, unsupported, or implausible . The court rejected the argument that the transfer was part of ordinary financial or family arrangements. (d) Discretion Given the statutory purpose of the Child Support Act — protecting children’s financial support — the court held that discretion should be exercised robustly in favour of CMS. Outcome The court set aside the property transfer under s.32L Child Support Act 1991 . The property was treated as if the disposition had not occurred , allowing CMS to pursue enforcement against it. The decision restored CMS’s ability to seek: Charging orders Orders for sale Other enforcement remedies Significance of the Decision (a) Strong Enforcement Message The case reinforces that: CMS has powerful tools to challenge asset-shielding behaviour; Attempts to defeat child maintenance obligations will be scrutinised closely. (b) Parallels with Matrimonial Finance The reasoning closely mirrors s.37 MCA 1973 cases: Substance over form Inference of intention Focus on practical effect Practitioners can draw analogies between financial remedy avoidance cases and CMS enforcement proceedings . (c) Connected Persons at Risk Transfers to partners, relatives, or close associates are particularly vulnerable to challenge where arrears exist. (d) Policy Emphasis The judgment underscores that child maintenance is not an optional debt — it enjoys strong statutory protection. Practical Take-Aways for Practitioners For CMS / SSWP: Gather clear evidence of: Timing of arrears vs transfer Knowledge of liability Lack of consideration Inference of intention is sufficient — direct proof is not required. For Respondents: Legitimate transfers must be: Properly documented Supported by clear consideration Capable of explanation independent of enforcement risk Weak or post-hoc justifications are unlikely to succeed. For Advisers: Warn clients that asset transfers after CMS involvement are high risk . Consider early negotiation or payment plans rather than attempting asset re-structuring. Concluding Observation SSWP v LR & Anor [2025] EWFC 271 (B) is an important reminder that the Family Court will take a robust, child-focused approach to enforcement. Where property is moved to avoid child maintenance, the court will not hesitate to unwind the transaction to protect the child’s entitlement. For family law advice and family court representation, contact Stephanie Heijdra public access family barrister via sheijdra@winvolvedlegal.co.uk