A detailed analysis of the case Y v E (Reasons for Departing from Cafcass Recommendation) [2025] EWHC 2437 (Fam)

 Parental responsibility and same-sex female partners after Re X (female partner non-acquisition of parental responsibility) [2026] EWFC 252 (B) Case note / blog post • Judgment dated 10 August 2026 • Family Court A birth certificate is powerful evidence of family status, but it is not always the source of that status. In Re X, the Family Court held that a mother’s unmarried female partner had not acquired parental responsibility merely because she had been registered as the child’s “parent”. The decision is an important reminder that legal parenthood, parental responsibility and birth registration are related concepts, but they are not interchangeable. Key takeaway Registration as a “parent” did not create legal parenthood. Because the child had not been conceived through the assisted-reproduction framework in section 43 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, the female partner could not acquire parental responsibility under section 4ZA of the Children Act 1989 simply by being named on the birth register. The facts AR and BM were both women. BM was X’s genetic and gestational mother. X had been conceived through sexual intercourse with a man before, or around the beginning of, BM’s relationship with AR; the pregnancy was not the result of assisted reproduction under the statutory scheme. About six weeks after X was born, BM and AR attended the register office. The birth certificate recorded AR under the heading “PARENT” and BM under “MOTHER”. AR later relied on that registration as the basis for saying that she had parental responsibility for X. After the relationship ended, AR applied for a child arrangements order. BM opposed the application and made allegations of domestic abuse. Those allegations were not determined in this preliminary judgment. The judge dealt only with the legal question of whether AR had parental responsibility and the procedural consequences that followed. The legal question: does registration create parental responsibility? The court’s answer was no. Recorder Sirikanda KC distinguished between three ideas that can easily be blurred in practice: · Legal parenthood: whether a person is recognised by law as a parent of the child. · Birth registration: the official record of the birth and the persons recorded as parents. · Parental responsibility: the statutory bundle of rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority relating to a child. The judgment relied on the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Re J (Loss of Parental Responsibility) [2026] EWCA Civ 344. There, the Court of Appeal held that registration does not itself manufacture legal parenthood: a person must first satisfy the legal criteria for being the child’s parent. The Family Court applied the same logic to a female partner registered as a parent. Why section 43 HFEA 2008 mattered For an unmarried woman to be treated as the second legal parent under section 43 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, the child must be born following treatment falling within the statutory assisted-reproduction scheme and the agreed female parenthood conditions must be satisfied. Section 4ZA of the Children Act 1989 then provides routes by which that second female parent can acquire parental responsibility, including registration as a parent. In Re X, the child was conceived through sexual intercourse and not through assisted reproduction. AR therefore did not become a legal parent under section 43 in the first place. Without that underlying legal parenthood, her appearance on the birth certificate could not trigger parental responsibility under section 4ZA. The decision The court declared that AR did not have parental responsibility for X. The judge also said that, if the parties’ descriptions of the registration appointment were accurate, it was concerning that an unmarried, non-genetic and non-gestational female partner might have been registered as a parent without the statutory conditions being met. A copy of the judgment was directed to be sent to the Registrar General. There was a further procedural consequence. Because AR was not a legal parent and did not otherwise fall within the categories entitled to apply for a section 8 Children Act order as of right, the court held that she needed permission to make the application. The judge therefore directed that a permission application be made and determined. What the case means in practice The judgment is especially relevant to unmarried female couples, former partners and professionals advising families formed outside the traditional parentage model. It highlights several practical points: · A birth certificate is not conclusive of legal parenthood. It is important evidence, but the legal status must still have a valid statutory basis. · The route to conception matters. For a second female parent relying on section 43 HFEA 2008, the statutory assisted-reproduction requirements are central. · Legal parenthood and parental responsibility should be checked separately. Even where a person has played a full parenting role in a child’s life, the legal analysis may be different from the social or psychological reality. · Registration errors can have consequences years later. An assumption made at birth may become critical after separation, particularly when decisions about contact, schooling, medical treatment or litigation arise. · A person without parental responsibility may still have legal options. Depending on the facts, this can include seeking permission to apply for a child arrangements order and, in appropriate cases, considering other routes to secure legal status. The correct route is fact-sensitive and specialist advice is important. A note for separating families Re X does not say that the day-to-day relationship between a child and a non-legal parent is unimportant. On the contrary, the judgment records AR’s case that she had been a psychological parent to X and was seeking continued contact. The point decided was narrower: her status could not be derived from the birth certificate where the statutory basis for legal parenthood was absent. That distinction matters. Family life can be socially real and emotionally significant even where the legal structure does not match the family’s understanding of itself. When separation occurs, identifying legal parenthood and parental responsibility early can prevent avoidable procedural disputes and help the court focus on the child’s welfare issues that actually need determination. Final thoughts Re X is a useful reminder that family status is created by law, not by the wording of a certificate alone. For same-sex female couples, the precise circumstances of conception, relationship status and any fertility-clinic consents can be decisive. For practitioners, the case reinforces the need to establish the legal basis of parenthood before assuming that a person named on a birth certificate automatically holds parental responsibility. Sources · Family Law Week case page · BAILII: Re X [2026] EWFC 252 (B) · Children Act 1989, section 4ZA · Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, section 43 · BAILII: Re J (Loss of Parental Responsibility) [2026] EWCA Civ 344 Disclaimer: This article is for general information only and does not constitute legal advice. The judgment is fact-specific. Anyone affected by questions of legal parenthood or parental responsibility should obtain advice on their own circumstances. For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk or 02071014682

A case comment on overseas customary marriage, civil recognition, nullity and the distinction between a void marriage and a non-qualifying ceremony. The High Court’s decision in B v B (Declaration as to Marital Status) [2026] EWHC 1317 (Fam) provides an important reminder of the complexities that can arise when English family courts are asked to determine the status of a marriage celebrated overseas according to customary or religious traditions. The case concerned a Cameroonian customary marriage, an alleged customary divorce and sharply conflicting accounts of the parties’ relationship. Ultimately, Mr David Rees KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, concluded that the parties had undergone a customary marriage ceremony in Cameroon in 2008, but that the marriage had never acquired civil recognition under Cameroonian law. Under English law, the ceremony nevertheless amounted to a void marriage rather than a non-qualifying ceremony. The distinction was crucial because it determined both the parties’ legal status and the remedy available to them. Background The husband applied under section 55 of the Family Law Act 1986 seeking declarations concerning the parties’ marital status. Both parties accepted that they had participated in a customary marriage ceremony, but almost everything else about the history of the relationship was disputed. The husband maintained that the parties had married under customary law in Cameroon in January 2003. He said that a further ceremony in September 2008 merely involved payment of the outstanding bride price. He also claimed that the marriage had subsequently been dissolved through a customary divorce ceremony in Cameroon in September 2022. The wife’s account was very different. She said that she did not meet the husband until 2007 and that the parties’ actual customary marriage took place in September 2008, with the husband represented by proxy. She denied that any customary divorce had taken place in 2022. The factual findings The court was confronted with fundamentally incompatible evidence from the parties and members of their respective families. The judge concluded that neither side’s evidence could simply be regarded as wholly reliable and approached the competing accounts with considerable caution. On the balance of probabilities, however, the judge preferred the wife’s version. The court found that the parties underwent a customary marriage ceremony in Village B, Cameroon, in September 2008. There had been no marriage ceremony in 2003 and no subsequent civil ceremony or civil registration of the customary marriage. The court also rejected the husband’s contention that a customary divorce had taken place in September 2022. There was insufficient evidence that the ceremony had happened at all and, in any event, the expert evidence suggested that the ceremony described by the husband would not have complied with the necessary customary requirements for dissolution. Was the 2008 ceremony a valid marriage? Having determined what had actually happened, the court then had to decide what legal status should be given to the 2008 ceremony. This required consideration of Cameroonian law. The court received expert evidence from a Cameroonian lawyer, Ms Josepha Sulem-Yong. Her evidence was that Cameroonian law recognises the social reality of marriages celebrated under tribal custom, but a customary ceremony alone does not give the marriage civil legal effect. Under the legal regime applicable to the parties’ marriage, further steps were required for a customary marriage to obtain civil recognition, including obtaining a declaration and registering the marriage with the civil registrar. Those formalities had never been completed. Importantly, however, the additional requirements were essentially steps capable of giving civil recognition to an already completed customary ceremony. A second marriage ceremony was not required. Void marriage or non-qualifying ceremony? That distinction led the court to consider the principles set out in Tousi v Gaydukova [2023] EWHC 404 (Fam). The starting point is that the formal validity of an overseas marriage is ordinarily governed by the law of the place where it was celebrated. Where foreign law treats a marriage as defective because certain formalities were not completed, but nevertheless allows the marriage to be subsequently validated or ratified by completion of those formalities, English law may treat the relationship as a void marriage rather than as no marriage at all. That was the position in B v B. The parties had gone through a genuine customary marriage ceremony. The ceremony complied with the relevant customary traditions, including representation of the husband by proxy, family involvement, exchange of gifts and payment connected with the bride price. The problem was that the parties had never taken the additional steps necessary to give that marriage civil recognition in Cameroon. The High Court therefore held that the marriage was void under English law. It was not a “non-qualifying ceremony”. Why does the distinction matter? The difference between a void marriage and a non-qualifying ceremony can have significant consequences. A non-qualifying ceremony is generally treated as never having created a marriage for the purposes of English matrimonial law. By contrast, a void marriage is recognised as a marriage requiring formal legal termination through a decree or order of nullity. This can be particularly important where financial remedies are concerned. In B v B, it also meant that the husband could not obtain the declaration he had asked the court to make. Section 58(5) of the Family Law Act 1986 prevents the court from making a declaration that a marriage was void from its inception. The judge therefore made no order on the husband’s application under section 55. Instead, the court held that either party could apply for a nullity order relying upon the factual findings made in the judgment. The immigration dimension There was a further unusual aspect to the proceedings. The court found that false information had been supplied to the UK immigration authorities concerning the parties’ relationship and that both parties had knowingly participated in arrangements under which the wife entered the United Kingdom using a false identity and documentation. The judge was careful not to determine who had actually created particular false documents. Nevertheless, he found that both parties had knowingly participated in misleading the UK authorities. The husband asked for the judgment to be disclosed to the Home Secretary and the wife did not object. The judge directed that an unredacted copy should be provided to the Secretary of State, emphasising the principle that the confidentiality attaching to family proceedings should not be used to conceal findings in which another public authority has a legitimate interest. Wider disclosure remained prohibited without further permission from the court. What can family lawyers take from B v B? The judgment illustrates why determining whether an overseas marriage is valid can rarely be answered simply by asking whether a ceremony took place. The court may need to establish precisely what ceremony occurred, which system of law applied, what formalities that law required and what legal effect the foreign jurisdiction gives to a failure to comply with those requirements. Expert evidence on foreign law can therefore be decisive. B v B also reinforces the importance of distinguishing between a ceremony which is legally incapable of creating a marriage and one which is capable of creating a legally recognised marriage but is defective because additional formalities have not been completed. That distinction may appear technical, but its practical consequences can be substantial. It can determine whether there is no marriage for English law purposes or whether there is instead a void marriage requiring a nullity order, with the matrimonial consequences that may follow. Conclusion B v B is a useful addition to the developing case law concerning overseas and customary marriages. Despite the extraordinary factual disputes between the parties, the central legal point is relatively clear: the failure to complete foreign civil registration requirements does not automatically mean that a customary ceremony should be treated as a non-marriage in England and Wales. Where the ceremony is recognised by the foreign legal system as one capable of subsequently acquiring full legal validity, English law may instead classify it as a void marriage. For practitioners dealing with international families, the case is another reminder that the precise legal effect of the ceremony in the country where it took place must be established before conclusions are drawn about a couple’s marital status in England and Wales. Key takeaway: The High Court held that a Cameroonian customary marriage ceremony, although never civilly registered, was a void marriage under English law rather than a non-qualifying ceremony. The distinction affected the remedy available to the parties and preserved the possibility of nullity proceedings. Case details and sources Case: B v B (Declaration as to Marital Status) [2026] EWHC 1317 (Fam). Judge: Mr David Rees KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court. Judgment date: 3 June 2026. Full judgment: The National Archives - Find Case Law Editorial note: This article is a general case comment and does not constitute legal advice.

The Family Court’s decision in DR v ES and Ors (Further LSPO Application) [2026] EWFC 15 is a useful reminder that Legal Services Payment Orders are not simply about funding litigation in the abstract. They are about ensuring that a party can participate effectively and fairly in financial remedy proceedings. The case concerned the wife’s further application for a Legal Services Payment Order in long-running financial remedy proceedings. Family Law Week summarised the application as one made by the wife for a further LSPO in the context of protracted financial remedy litigation. Background The parties married in August 2008 and separated in early 2021. Financial remedy proceedings followed, with the First Appointment taking place in September 2021. By the time of this application, the litigation had already generated two previous reported judgments and three previous LSPOs in the wife’s favour. The financial landscape was substantial. The net assets were recorded at approximately £18 million , largely held through two property-owning companies. The husband’s interest in one company, Y Ltd, had been determined to be 100% and valued at approximately £6.67 million , while his one-third share in X Ltd was valued at approximately £14.34 million . The wife sought a further LSPO of £726,246.46 . That sum included outstanding historic costs and future costs to take the matter through to final hearing. A key issue was that the wife had exceeded the budget set by an earlier LSPO order. The husband argued that the previous order should have been treated as a limit, and that revisiting the overspend risked turning the LSPO application into a disguised inter partes costs exercise. The Court’s Approach The court accepted that an LSPO is not a blank cheque. Where a costs budget has been set, parties and their advisers are expected to take it seriously. The fact that litigation has become difficult, expensive or acrimonious does not automatically justify unlimited further funding. However, the court also recognised the practical reality of the case. The wife’s solicitors had provided evidence that they would not continue to act if outstanding bills remained unpaid. That mattered because, without representation, the wife would have been placed at a serious disadvantage in complex proceedings where the husband remained able to fund his own legal team. The court therefore made a further LSPO, but not for the full amount sought. The total order was £560,120 . Stewarts’ summary records that this comprised £154,570 for costs already incurred and £405,550 for future costs to the final hearing. Financial Remedies Journal breaks down part of the historic element further, noting that £107,250 was awarded in respect of historic costs as at 5 January 2026, with the remainder covering costs from that date through to the final hearing. Why the Decision Matters The judgment is important because it shows the court balancing two competing principles. First, budget discipline matters . A party who has obtained an LSPO cannot assume that any overspend will be retrospectively approved. The court expressly recognised that an LSPO is not permission to incur costs beyond the scope of the order. Second, fairness of process matters too . If unpaid historic costs mean that a financially weaker party’s solicitors will cease acting, the court may include some historic costs within a further LSPO. This is particularly so where the other party remains able to fund representation and where the litigation history has contributed to the costs burden. That distinction is crucial. The court was not simply reimbursing overspend. It was asking whether, without payment, the wife would be unable to continue obtaining appropriate legal services. The answer, on the evidence, was yes. Practical Lessons for LSPO Applications For applicants, the case underlines the importance of evidence. A further LSPO application should not rely on broad assertions that funding is needed. It should explain what has been spent, why it was spent, what remains to be done, what future costs are anticipated, and what will happen if funding is refused. Evidence from solicitors can be decisive. In this case, the court was influenced by the indication that the wife’s solicitors would not continue acting on credit. That evidence helped connect the unpaid costs to the wife’s future ability to participate in the proceedings. For respondents, the case is a warning that arguments about budget discipline may not be enough if they ignore the wider litigation reality. A respondent who can fund their own legal team, or raise funds against assets, may struggle to resist an LSPO where refusal would leave the other party under-represented. The payment mechanism is also notable. The court required funds raised by the husband to be applied in descending priority: first to security for maintenance pending suit, then to LSPO provision, and only then to the husband’s own legal costs. The order also restricted the husband from paying his own advisers in greater amounts or sooner than he discharged the LSPO liability. Conclusion DR v ES is not authority for the proposition that every LSPO overspend will be rescued by the court. It is a more careful and practical decision than that. The message is that court-approved budgets remain important, but they will not be applied so rigidly that they defeat the underlying purpose of an LSPO: enabling fair participation in financial remedy proceedings. Where historic unpaid costs create a real risk that a party will lose representation, and where the other party remains financially able to litigate, the court may intervene to preserve equality of arms. For practitioners, the lesson is clear: prepare LSPO evidence carefully, budget realistically, explain any overspend promptly, and focus the application on the practical question the court must answer — whether the applicant can continue to obtain appropriate legal services without the order. For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra public access family barrister via sheijdra[@}winvolvedlegal.co.uk Read the full judgment here

The long-running litigation between Natalia Potanina and Vladimir Potanin returned to the Family Court in Potanina v Potanin (Case Management) [2026] EWFC 80 , where MacDonald J considered a series of important case management issues following the Court of Appeal's decision to grant the wife permission to pursue financial relief in England under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 . Although the hearing concerned procedural matters rather than substantive financial claims, the judgment provides valuable guidance on the Family Court's approach to case management in large-scale international financial remedy litigation. It also illustrates the challenges faced when domestic proceedings intersect with foreign litigation, sanctions regimes and complex international wealth structures. Background Natalia Potanina and Vladimir Potanin married in the former Soviet Union in 1983 and divorced in Russia in 2014 after a marriage lasting more than thirty years. During the marriage, the husband amassed enormous wealth, including interests in major Russian businesses. The wife contends that she received only a tiny fraction of the marital wealth on divorce because Russian law did not take account of assets beneficially owned by the husband through corporate and trust structures. Following extensive litigation in Russia and other jurisdictions, the wife moved to England and sought permission to bring a claim for financial relief under Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984. After years of litigation in the Family Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal ultimately granted the wife leave to pursue her claim. The matter therefore returned to the Family Division for substantive case management. What Is Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984? Part III enables a spouse who has obtained a foreign divorce to seek financial relief in England and Wales in limited circumstances. The jurisdiction exists to alleviate injustice where the financial consequences of an overseas divorce leave one party inadequately provided for. However, the English court will only entertain such claims where there is a sufficient jurisdictional connection and where the applicant can demonstrate substantial grounds for bringing the claim. Part III applications have often been described as a remedy designed to prevent serious unfairness rather than to permit a simple re-litigation of foreign divorce proceedings. The Issues Before MacDonald J At this case management hearing, MacDonald J considered several important procedural applications, including: whether the English proceedings should be adjourned pending proceedings in Russia; whether there should be a preliminary or split hearing; whether a previous stay on disclosure should be lifted; whether expert evidence on Russian law was necessary; and how issues relating to UK financial sanctions and licensing should be addressed. Adjournment Refused The husband sought an adjournment of the English proceedings pending developments in Russian litigation. MacDonald J refused that application. The decision reflects the Family Court's reluctance to permit foreign proceedings to derail or indefinitely delay domestic litigation, particularly where the English court has already determined that it has jurisdiction and that the applicant should be permitted to proceed. The judgment demonstrates the court's commitment to ensuring that Part III claims progress efficiently once permission has been granted. No Split Hearing The husband also invited the court to direct a split hearing. The court declined to do so. Split hearings can sometimes promote efficiency where discrete issues can conveniently be determined in advance. However, in complex international financial remedy proceedings, the issues are frequently so intertwined that fragmentation may increase cost and delay rather than reduce it. MacDonald J concluded that the interests of justice favoured the progression of the case towards a single final hearing. Disclosure Remains Central A particularly significant aspect of the judgment was the court's decision to lift a stay on disclosure. Disclosure lies at the heart of financial remedy proceedings. The Family Court cannot properly determine claims involving vast international wealth without a full understanding of the nature, ownership and value of the relevant assets. The decision underscores the long-established principle that transparency remains fundamental, even in exceptionally complex international cases involving offshore structures, foreign proceedings and allegations concerning beneficial ownership. The Impact of Sanctions An unusual feature of this litigation is that the husband is subject to UK sanctions. As a result, any financial award made by the court may require authorisation from the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI). MacDonald J therefore had to consider directions concerning sanctions licensing as part of the broader case management exercise. The judgment highlights the increasingly important intersection between family law and sanctions law in international financial remedy cases. Key Principles Emerging from the Case 1. Permission Is Only the Beginning Obtaining leave under Part III does not determine the substantive claim. It merely allows the applicant to proceed to the next stage. 2. The Court Will Act Robustly to Progress Proceedings Once jurisdiction has been established, the Family Court is unlikely to permit repeated procedural applications to prevent a case from advancing. 3. Full Disclosure Remains Essential Complex ownership structures, trusts and offshore entities do not diminish the obligation to provide proper disclosure. 4. International Cases Raise Increasingly Complex Procedural Issues Modern financial remedy litigation may involve: multiple jurisdictions; competing foreign proceedings; sanctions regimes; expert evidence on foreign law; and sophisticated corporate structures. Why This Case Matters Although this judgment concerns case management rather than substantive relief, it is important because it demonstrates how the Family Court intends to manage one of the largest and most complex financial claims ever brought in England and Wales. The case also serves as a reminder that Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 continues to play a vital role in addressing potential unfairness arising from overseas divorce proceedings. Conclusion  Potanina v Potanin [2026] EWFC 80 marks the latest chapter in a litigation saga that has already spanned multiple jurisdictions and several appellate courts. MacDonald J's robust case management approach signals that, once permission has been granted under Part III, the court expects proceedings to move forward efficiently notwithstanding the complexity of the international landscape. For practitioners, the case offers valuable insight into the management of large-scale international financial remedy litigation and the increasingly significant interaction between family law, foreign proceedings and sanctions regimes. Keywords: Potanina v Potanin, Part III MFPA 1984, international divorce, foreign divorce, financial remedies, sanctions, MacDonald J, family law, divorce tourism, international family law. Read the full judgment here For Family Law Advice and family court representation, contact Stephanie Heijdra Public Access Family barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk

The decision in M v F and A [2026] EWFC 106 (B) is a striking example of the Family Court's willingness to make long-term protective orders where a child's welfare requires enduring protection from a parent. In this case, HHJ Owens was asked to consider whether existing protective orders should continue well beyond childhood, including whether: a Prohibited Steps Order (PSO) preventing the father from meeting or communicating with the child, A, should remain in force until A reached the age of 18; an existing Non-Molestation Order (NMO) should be extended until A completed university; and a section 91(14) Children Act 1989 order should prevent further applications concerning A until she turned 18. The judgment highlights the court's increasingly robust approach in cases involving ongoing emotional harm, coercive behaviour and the need to provide children with long-term stability. Background The proceedings concerned A, a child who had been the subject of previous protective orders. The mother sought the continuation and extension of those orders on the basis that ongoing contact or communication from the father would be harmful to A and detrimental to her welfare. The court therefore had to balance two competing principles: the general expectation that children benefit from a relationship with both parents; and the overriding principle that the child's welfare is the court's paramount consideration. Extending the Prohibited Steps Order The court considered whether the existing Prohibited Steps Order should continue until A attained the age of 18. A Prohibited Steps Order is made pursuant to section 8 of the Children Act 1989 and prevents a person from taking specified steps in relation to a child without the permission of the court. Such orders are commonly used to prevent removal from the jurisdiction or other significant decisions concerning a child. In this case, HHJ Owens concluded that the continuation of the PSO was necessary in order to protect A from unwanted contact and communication by the father. The judgment demonstrates that, where the evidence establishes a real risk of emotional harm, the court may conclude that the welfare advantages of preserving a child's stability outweigh the benefits of maintaining a parental relationship. Extending the Non-Molestation Order The court was also asked to extend an existing Non-Molestation Order until A completed university. Non-Molestation Orders are protective injunctions made under the Family Law Act 1996. Their purpose is to protect individuals from harassment, intimidation, coercive or abusive behaviour. Breach of such an order constitutes a criminal offence. The extension sought in this case was unusual because of its proposed duration. The court was satisfied, however, that the evidence justified ongoing protection extending into A's early adulthood, reflecting the continuing impact that domestic abuse and coercive behaviour can have upon young people long after childhood has formally ended. The Section 91(14) Order Perhaps the most significant aspect of the case was the application for a section 91(14) order lasting until A reached 18. A section 91(14) order restricts a party from making further applications under the Children Act 1989 without first obtaining the permission of the court. It is intended to act as a protective filter, preventing unnecessary or harmful litigation. Historically, such orders were regarded as exceptional measures and a "weapon of last resort". The modern statutory framework, however, expressly recognises that such orders may be appropriate where future applications would place a child or another individual at risk of harm. The decision in M v F and A illustrates the court's readiness to utilise section 91(14) orders in order to: provide children with respite from litigation; protect victims from ongoing abuse through the court process; and ensure long-term emotional stability. Key Legal Principles The judgment reinforces a number of important principles: 1. Welfare Remains Paramount Even where a parent seeks contact or renewed involvement in a child's life, the child's welfare remains the court's paramount consideration. 2. Litigation Can Itself Constitute Harm Repeated or unnecessary litigation may amount to a source of emotional harm for both children and the resident parent. Section 91(14) orders are designed to prevent such harm. 3. Protective Orders May Be Long-Term The court may make or extend protective orders for substantial periods where the evidence demonstrates that such protection is necessary and proportionate. The duration of any order must remain closely linked to the harm the court seeks to avoid.  Practical Implications For parents involved in private law children proceedings, the case serves as an important reminder that: the court can significantly restrict future applications where litigation itself is harmful; domestic abuse and coercive behaviour may justify extensive protective measures; and long-term stability for children will often take precedence over the wishes of an adult litigant. Conclusion M v F and A [2026] EWFC 106 (B) demonstrates the Family Court's willingness to use its protective powers robustly where necessary to safeguard children and their carers. The judgment confirms that, in appropriate cases, the court may extend Prohibited Steps Orders, Non-Molestation Orders and section 91(14) orders for lengthy periods in order to protect children from harm and to provide them with the stability needed to thrive. Read the judgment here Keywords: M v F and A, Prohibited Steps Order, Non-Molestation Order, section 91(14), Children Act 1989, domestic abuse, child arrangements, Family Court, HHJ Owens. For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra Public Access Family Barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk

The Supreme Court's decision in Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26 is arguably the most significant financial remedies judgment of the last decade. It provides long-awaited clarification on the distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property and, in particular, the circumstances in which non-matrimonial assets may become "matrimonialised". For family lawyers, financial advisers and divorcing spouses alike, the judgment marks a decisive shift towards greater protection of pre-marital and non-marital wealth. Background The parties married in 2005 and enjoyed a very high standard of living. The husband had accumulated substantial wealth before the marriage, including investments worth approximately £77.8 million. In 2017, as part of inheritance tax planning, the husband transferred those investments to the wife with the expectation that she would place them into trusts for the benefit of their children. The trusts were never established and the assets remained in the wife's name when divorce proceedings commenced. The key question was whether those transferred assets had become matrimonial property and were therefore subject to the sharing principle. The Earlier Decisions At first instance, Moor J concluded that the transfer had effectively matrimonialised the assets. Although recognising that the wealth originated from the husband's unmatched contribution, he awarded the wife £45 million. The Court of Appeal disagreed. It held that the source of the wealth remained the critical factor and that the transfer itself had not converted the assets into matrimonial property. The wife's award was reduced to approximately £25 million. The wife appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's Decision The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It confirmed that the sharing principle applies only to matrimonial property and does not automatically extend to non-matrimonial assets. The Court emphasised several important principles: -Source Matters The distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property is fundamentally concerned with the source of the asset. Non-matrimonial property will commonly include: Assets acquired before the marriage; Inheritances; Gifts from third parties. Matrimonial property, by contrast, generally represents the fruits of the marital partnership. -Legal Ownership Is Not Determinative The Court rejected the notion that a transfer of legal title automatically changes the character of an asset. Simply because property is placed in a spouse's name does not mean it becomes matrimonial property. The court must examine the purpose and treatment of the asset. -Matrimonialisation Requires More Than Transfer The Court confirmed that matrimonialisation occurs where parties have treated property as shared over time as part of the marriage partnership. The 2017 transfer was made: For inheritance tax planning; With the intention of benefiting the children; Not as a gift intended to create shared matrimonial wealth. Accordingly, there was no matrimonialisation. Why This Case Matters Standish is important because it provides clarity where previous authorities had left uncertainty. For many years, practitioners debated whether transferring non-matrimonial assets between spouses would automatically expose those assets to equal sharing claims. The Supreme Court has now made clear that: A transfer alone is not enough. The court must examine the wider context, including the purpose of the transfer and the way in which the parties subsequently treated the asset. Implications for Future Cases The decision is likely to have a significant impact in high-net-worth financial remedy cases. Those seeking to preserve pre-marital wealth now have stronger authority for the proposition that: Source remains critically important; Tax planning transfers do not automatically matrimonialise assets; Non-matrimonial property is generally outside the sharing principle. However, the judgment does not eliminate matrimonialisation altogether. Assets may still become matrimonial where the parties have genuinely treated them as part of the shared marital enterprise over a sustained period. Practical Lessons For spouses and advisers, the case highlights the importance of: Careful wealth planning; Clear documentation of intentions; Appropriate use of pre-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements; Understanding the distinction between legal ownership and beneficial treatment. Conclusion Standish v Standish is now the leading authority on matrimonialisation. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the conceptual distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property and clarified that the sharing principle applies only to matrimonial assets. The decision provides greater certainty for divorcing couples and their advisers, while preserving the court's ability to recognise genuine sharing where assets have truly become part of the marital partnership. #StandishvStandish #matrimonialisation #non-matrimonialproperty #sharingprinciple #divorcefinances #financialremedies #SupremeCourt #familylaw #UKSC26 For divorce law advice and divorce court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra family barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk Read the full judgment here

An analysis of Kanabar v Kanabar [2026] EWCA Civ 582 This is one of the most important procedural financial remedies appeals of 2026. It addresses a previously under-explored problem: What happens when a party who has already obtained permission to appeal dies intestate, and nobody is willing or able to obtain authority to act for the estate? Nobody appeared willing to take on that role. appealed to the Court of Appeal. question had largely been answered by authorities such as and Unger v Ul-Hasan. Instead the question was: Can an appeal continue when there is no legally constituted appellant because nobody has authority to represent the deceased's estate? - an administrator. In that case proceedings may continue. situation in Kanabar. there is nobody to give instructions; there is nobody against whom costs orders or procedural directions can operate. legally constituted appellant before the court at all. grant of representation to be obtained; but having decided not to do so, the appeal should have been struck out. compelling reason" to do so. with Unger The case is best understood alongside. Unger reaffirmed the orthodox position that claims for financial relief are generally personal statutory rights and obligations which cannot normally be adjudicated after death, subject to limited exceptions. Obtain probate or letters of administration as quickly as possible. the appeal can proceed informally. effectively terminate the appeal. Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane financial remedy claims are often regarded as substantive economic rights. Yet, as both Unger and Kanabar demonstrate, the law still treats many of those rights as fundamentally personal and dependent upon living parties. Its practical message is straightforward: an appeal may survive death, but only if someone with legal authority survives to conduct it. For legal advice on family matters or divorce court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra direct access family barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk Read the full judgment here

High Court (Family Division) — Prenuptial agreements, fairness, and “gap-filling” powers

An analysis of TY v XA (No. 4) [2025] EWFC 488 High Court (Cusworth J) — Enforcement, LSPOs, and preservation pending appeal This is a post-final-order enforcement decision dealing with: Non-payment of school fees Non-compliance with a Legal Services Provision Order (LSPO) Whether assets should be preserved while the husband seeks permission to appeal Context By the time of this hearing: Financial orders had already been made The husband was in breach of ongoing obligations The wife sought: enforcement of school fees payment under an LSPO protective measures over assets The husband sought to: delay or resist enforcement pursue an appeal Core Issues Should the court enforce existing financial obligations immediately ? Should the husband be required to fund the wife’s legal costs (LSPO) ? Should the court preserve assets pending an appeal? Legal Framework Enforcement Orders must be complied with unless varied or stayed Appeal does not automatically suspend obligations LSPO Under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973: Court may order one party to fund the other’s legal costs Test: “level playing field” Preservation of assets Court has powers to: prevent dissipation maintain status quo pending litigation Key Findings A. Orders remain binding despite appeal The court emphasised: A party cannot avoid compliance simply because they intend to appeal - No automatic stay This is a critical enforcement principle . B. Enforcement of school fees The court treated school fees as: priority obligations linked to children’s welfare Failure to pay was viewed seriously. - The court moved to compel compliance C. LSPO — maintaining fairness The wife required funding to: respond to the appeal continue litigation The court considered: disparity of resources conduct of the husband - LSPO justified to ensure equality of arms D. Preservation of assets A key concern: risk that the husband might: move assets reduce enforceability of orders The court granted protective measures to: - preserve the asset base pending appeal Husband’s Position Typical arguments (rejected or limited): Appeal should delay enforcement Financial pressure unfair Asset restriction disproportionate The court was not persuaded. Key Principles Reinforced - Appeal ≠ suspension of obligations Unless a stay is granted , orders must be obeyed. - Children’s needs take priority School fees are treated as: essential, not discretionary - LSPO ensures procedural fairness A party cannot: litigate aggressively while denying the other funding Courts will actively protect assets Where there is risk: preservation orders will be used robustly Conduct and Credibility The judgment reflects concern about: non-compliance litigation tactics possible asset manoeuvring This influences: willingness to grant LSPO strength of enforcement measures Strategic Importance For applicants (wives typically) This case supports: -Immediate enforcement despite appeal - Strong LSPO applications - Asset preservation orders For respondents (husbands typically) It warns: -Appeal is not a shield - Non-payment weakens credibility - Courts will intervene early Place in Wider Jurisprudence This case aligns with a trend toward: firmer enforcement culture less tolerance of tactical delay stronger protection of economically weaker party Practical Takeaways If enforcing: Act quickly Seek: LSPO freezing/preservation orders If resisting: Apply formally for a stay Provide: clear evidence of inability to pay credible appeal grounds Bottom Line TY v XA (No. 4) [2025] EWFC 488 confirms: Financial orders must be complied with immediately unless stayed Courts will: enforce child-related obligations robustly grant LSPOs to ensure fairness preserve assets where enforcement is at risk Final Insight This is a strong, practical enforcement judgment : The Family Court will not allow appeal tactics to undermine compliance or fairness. For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra direct access family barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk