M v F and A [2026] EWFC 106 (B): The Family Court Extends Protective Orders Until Adulthood
23 June 2026
The decision in M v F and A [2026] EWFC 106 (B) is a striking example of the Family Court's willingness to make long-term protective orders where a child's welfare requires enduring protection from a parent.
In this case, HHJ Owens was asked to consider whether existing protective orders should continue well beyond childhood, including whether:
- a Prohibited Steps Order (PSO) preventing the father from meeting or communicating with the child, A, should remain in force until A reached the age of 18;
- an existing Non-Molestation Order (NMO) should be extended until A completed university; and
- a section 91(14) Children Act 1989 order should prevent further applications concerning A until she turned 18.
The judgment highlights the court's increasingly robust approach in cases involving ongoing emotional harm, coercive behaviour and the need to provide children with long-term stability.
Background
The proceedings concerned A, a child who had been the subject of previous protective orders.
The mother sought the continuation and extension of those orders on the basis that ongoing contact or communication from the father would be harmful to A and detrimental to her welfare.
The court therefore had to balance two competing principles:
- the general expectation that children benefit from a relationship with both parents; and
- the overriding principle that the child's welfare is the court's paramount consideration.
Extending the Prohibited Steps Order
The court considered whether the existing Prohibited Steps Order should continue until A attained the age of 18.
A Prohibited Steps Order is made pursuant to section 8 of the Children Act 1989 and prevents a person from taking specified steps in relation to a child without the permission of the court. Such orders are commonly used to prevent removal from the jurisdiction or other significant decisions concerning a child.
In this case, HHJ Owens concluded that the continuation of the PSO was necessary in order to protect A from unwanted contact and communication by the father.
The judgment demonstrates that, where the evidence establishes a real risk of emotional harm, the court may conclude that the welfare advantages of preserving a child's stability outweigh the benefits of maintaining a parental relationship.
Extending the Non-Molestation Order
The court was also asked to extend an existing Non-Molestation Order until A completed university.
Non-Molestation Orders are protective injunctions made under the Family Law Act 1996. Their purpose is to protect individuals from harassment, intimidation, coercive or abusive behaviour. Breach of such an order constitutes a criminal offence.
The extension sought in this case was unusual because of its proposed duration.
The court was satisfied, however, that the evidence justified ongoing protection extending into A's early adulthood, reflecting the continuing impact that domestic abuse and coercive behaviour can have upon young people long after childhood has formally ended.
The Section 91(14) Order
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the case was the application for a section 91(14) order lasting until A reached 18.
A section 91(14) order restricts a party from making further applications under the Children Act 1989 without first obtaining the permission of the court. It is intended to act as a protective filter, preventing unnecessary or harmful litigation.
Historically, such orders were regarded as exceptional measures and a "weapon of last resort". The modern statutory framework, however, expressly recognises that such orders may be appropriate where future applications would place a child or another individual at risk of harm.
The decision in M v F and A illustrates the court's readiness to utilise section 91(14) orders in order to:
- provide children with respite from litigation;
- protect victims from ongoing abuse through the court process; and
- ensure long-term emotional stability.
Key Legal Principles
The judgment reinforces a number of important principles:
1. Welfare Remains Paramount
Even where a parent seeks contact or renewed involvement in a child's life, the child's welfare remains the court's paramount consideration.
2. Litigation Can Itself Constitute Harm
Repeated or unnecessary litigation may amount to a source of emotional harm for both children and the resident parent. Section 91(14) orders are designed to prevent such harm.
3. Protective Orders May Be Long-Term
The court may make or extend protective orders for substantial periods where the evidence demonstrates that such protection is necessary and proportionate. The duration of any order must remain closely linked to the harm the court seeks to avoid.
Practical Implications
For parents involved in private law children proceedings, the case serves as an important reminder that:
- the court can significantly restrict future applications where litigation itself is harmful;
- domestic abuse and coercive behaviour may justify extensive protective measures; and
- long-term stability for children will often take precedence over the wishes of an adult litigant.
Conclusion
M v F and A [2026] EWFC 106 (B) demonstrates the Family Court's willingness to use its protective powers robustly where necessary to safeguard children and their carers.
The judgment confirms that, in appropriate cases, the court may extend Prohibited Steps Orders, Non-Molestation Orders and section 91(14) orders for lengthy periods in order to protect children from harm and to provide them with the stability needed to thrive.
Read the judgment here
Keywords: M v F and A, Prohibited Steps Order, Non-Molestation Order, section 91(14), Children Act 1989, domestic abuse, child arrangements, Family Court, HHJ Owens.
For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra Public Access Family Barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk
The Supreme Court's decision in Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26 is arguably the most significant financial remedies judgment of the last decade. It provides long-awaited clarification on the distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property and, in particular, the circumstances in which non-matrimonial assets may become "matrimonialised". For family lawyers, financial advisers and divorcing spouses alike, the judgment marks a decisive shift towards greater protection of pre-marital and non-marital wealth. Background The parties married in 2005 and enjoyed a very high standard of living. The husband had accumulated substantial wealth before the marriage, including investments worth approximately £77.8 million. In 2017, as part of inheritance tax planning, the husband transferred those investments to the wife with the expectation that she would place them into trusts for the benefit of their children. The trusts were never established and the assets remained in the wife's name when divorce proceedings commenced. The key question was whether those transferred assets had become matrimonial property and were therefore subject to the sharing principle. The Earlier Decisions At first instance, Moor J concluded that the transfer had effectively matrimonialised the assets. Although recognising that the wealth originated from the husband's unmatched contribution, he awarded the wife £45 million. The Court of Appeal disagreed. It held that the source of the wealth remained the critical factor and that the transfer itself had not converted the assets into matrimonial property. The wife's award was reduced to approximately £25 million. The wife appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's Decision The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. It confirmed that the sharing principle applies only to matrimonial property and does not automatically extend to non-matrimonial assets. The Court emphasised several important principles: -Source Matters The distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property is fundamentally concerned with the source of the asset. Non-matrimonial property will commonly include: Assets acquired before the marriage; Inheritances; Gifts from third parties. Matrimonial property, by contrast, generally represents the fruits of the marital partnership. -Legal Ownership Is Not Determinative The Court rejected the notion that a transfer of legal title automatically changes the character of an asset. Simply because property is placed in a spouse's name does not mean it becomes matrimonial property. The court must examine the purpose and treatment of the asset. -Matrimonialisation Requires More Than Transfer The Court confirmed that matrimonialisation occurs where parties have treated property as shared over time as part of the marriage partnership. The 2017 transfer was made: For inheritance tax planning; With the intention of benefiting the children; Not as a gift intended to create shared matrimonial wealth. Accordingly, there was no matrimonialisation. Why This Case Matters Standish is important because it provides clarity where previous authorities had left uncertainty. For many years, practitioners debated whether transferring non-matrimonial assets between spouses would automatically expose those assets to equal sharing claims. The Supreme Court has now made clear that: A transfer alone is not enough. The court must examine the wider context, including the purpose of the transfer and the way in which the parties subsequently treated the asset. Implications for Future Cases The decision is likely to have a significant impact in high-net-worth financial remedy cases. Those seeking to preserve pre-marital wealth now have stronger authority for the proposition that: Source remains critically important; Tax planning transfers do not automatically matrimonialise assets; Non-matrimonial property is generally outside the sharing principle. However, the judgment does not eliminate matrimonialisation altogether. Assets may still become matrimonial where the parties have genuinely treated them as part of the shared marital enterprise over a sustained period. Practical Lessons For spouses and advisers, the case highlights the importance of: Careful wealth planning; Clear documentation of intentions; Appropriate use of pre-nuptial and post-nuptial agreements; Understanding the distinction between legal ownership and beneficial treatment. Conclusion Standish v Standish is now the leading authority on matrimonialisation. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the conceptual distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property and clarified that the sharing principle applies only to matrimonial assets. The decision provides greater certainty for divorcing couples and their advisers, while preserving the court's ability to recognise genuine sharing where assets have truly become part of the marital partnership. #StandishvStandish #matrimonialisation #non-matrimonialproperty #sharingprinciple #divorcefinances #financialremedies #SupremeCourt #familylaw #UKSC26 For divorce law advice and divorce court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra family barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk Read the full judgment here
An analysis of Kanabar v Kanabar [2026] EWCA Civ 582 This is one of the most important procedural financial remedies appeals of 2026. It addresses a previously under-explored problem: What happens when a party who has already obtained permission to appeal dies intestate, and nobody is willing or able to obtain authority to act for the estate? Nobody appeared willing to take on that role. appealed to the Court of Appeal. question had largely been answered by authorities such as and Unger v Ul-Hasan. Instead the question was: Can an appeal continue when there is no legally constituted appellant because nobody has authority to represent the deceased's estate? - an administrator. In that case proceedings may continue. situation in Kanabar. there is nobody to give instructions; there is nobody against whom costs orders or procedural directions can operate. legally constituted appellant before the court at all. grant of representation to be obtained; but having decided not to do so, the appeal should have been struck out. compelling reason" to do so. with Unger The case is best understood alongside. Unger reaffirmed the orthodox position that claims for financial relief are generally personal statutory rights and obligations which cannot normally be adjudicated after death, subject to limited exceptions. Obtain probate or letters of administration as quickly as possible. the appeal can proceed informally. effectively terminate the appeal. Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane financial remedy claims are often regarded as substantive economic rights. Yet, as both Unger and Kanabar demonstrate, the law still treats many of those rights as fundamentally personal and dependent upon living parties. Its practical message is straightforward: an appeal may survive death, but only if someone with legal authority survives to conduct it. For legal advice on family matters or divorce court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra direct access family barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk Read the full judgment here
High Court (Family Division) — Prenuptial agreements, fairness, and “gap-filling” powers
An analysis of TY v XA (No. 4) [2025] EWFC 488 High Court (Cusworth J) — Enforcement, LSPOs, and preservation pending appeal This is a post-final-order enforcement decision dealing with: Non-payment of school fees Non-compliance with a Legal Services Provision Order (LSPO) Whether assets should be preserved while the husband seeks permission to appeal Context By the time of this hearing: Financial orders had already been made The husband was in breach of ongoing obligations The wife sought: enforcement of school fees payment under an LSPO protective measures over assets The husband sought to: delay or resist enforcement pursue an appeal Core Issues Should the court enforce existing financial obligations immediately ? Should the husband be required to fund the wife’s legal costs (LSPO) ? Should the court preserve assets pending an appeal? Legal Framework Enforcement Orders must be complied with unless varied or stayed Appeal does not automatically suspend obligations LSPO Under Matrimonial Causes Act 1973: Court may order one party to fund the other’s legal costs Test: “level playing field” Preservation of assets Court has powers to: prevent dissipation maintain status quo pending litigation Key Findings A. Orders remain binding despite appeal The court emphasised: A party cannot avoid compliance simply because they intend to appeal - No automatic stay This is a critical enforcement principle . B. Enforcement of school fees The court treated school fees as: priority obligations linked to children’s welfare Failure to pay was viewed seriously. - The court moved to compel compliance C. LSPO — maintaining fairness The wife required funding to: respond to the appeal continue litigation The court considered: disparity of resources conduct of the husband - LSPO justified to ensure equality of arms D. Preservation of assets A key concern: risk that the husband might: move assets reduce enforceability of orders The court granted protective measures to: - preserve the asset base pending appeal Husband’s Position Typical arguments (rejected or limited): Appeal should delay enforcement Financial pressure unfair Asset restriction disproportionate The court was not persuaded. Key Principles Reinforced - Appeal ≠ suspension of obligations Unless a stay is granted , orders must be obeyed. - Children’s needs take priority School fees are treated as: essential, not discretionary - LSPO ensures procedural fairness A party cannot: litigate aggressively while denying the other funding Courts will actively protect assets Where there is risk: preservation orders will be used robustly Conduct and Credibility The judgment reflects concern about: non-compliance litigation tactics possible asset manoeuvring This influences: willingness to grant LSPO strength of enforcement measures Strategic Importance For applicants (wives typically) This case supports: -Immediate enforcement despite appeal - Strong LSPO applications - Asset preservation orders For respondents (husbands typically) It warns: -Appeal is not a shield - Non-payment weakens credibility - Courts will intervene early Place in Wider Jurisprudence This case aligns with a trend toward: firmer enforcement culture less tolerance of tactical delay stronger protection of economically weaker party Practical Takeaways If enforcing: Act quickly Seek: LSPO freezing/preservation orders If resisting: Apply formally for a stay Provide: clear evidence of inability to pay credible appeal grounds Bottom Line TY v XA (No. 4) [2025] EWFC 488 confirms: Financial orders must be complied with immediately unless stayed Courts will: enforce child-related obligations robustly grant LSPOs to ensure fairness preserve assets where enforcement is at risk Final Insight This is a strong, practical enforcement judgment : The Family Court will not allow appeal tactics to undermine compliance or fairness. For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra direct access family barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk
An analysis of MA v WK [2025] EWFC 499 This is a status case (not financial remedies) dealing with whether a religious marriage ceremony conducted in England can later become legally valid through registration abroad. Core Issue The court had to determine: Were Nikkah ceremonies conducted in England capable of creating valid marriages in English law, either: at the time of the ceremony, or later through registration in Pakistan? The court held: The Nikkah ceremonies were not valid marriages under English law They were non-qualifying ceremonies Subsequent registration in Pakistan could not cure the defect Therefore: - No marriage recognised in England and Wales - Applications for declarations of marital status were refused Legal Framework The decision sits within: Marriage Act 1949 Common law rules on recognition of marriage Key requirements for a valid English marriage: Conducted in an authorised place By an authorised person With proper formalities (notice, registration, witnesses) Classification of the Ceremonies The court had to decide whether the Nikkah ceremonies were: Valid marriages Void marriages Non-qualifying ceremonies Court’s conclusion: They were non-qualifying ceremonies This is crucial. What “non-qualifying” means: Not even an attempt to comply with the Marriage Act Outside the statutory framework entirely Produces no legal status at all Why the Ceremonies Failed A. No compliance with English law The ceremonies: Took place in England Did not follow Marriage Act formalities Were purely religious B. Not a “void marriage” The court emphasised: These were NOT void marriages They were legally non-existent This removes: financial remedy claims spousal rights C. No intention to create a legal marriage (in English law) A key factor: The parties did not engage with the legal framework The ceremony was not structured as a civil marriage attempt Effect of Pakistani Registration The applicants argued: The marriages were later registered in Pakistan Therefore should be recognised in England Court’s response: Rejected Reason: A marriage must be: valid at the place where it is celebrated Since: The ceremony occurred in England It was invalid here Foreign registration cannot retrospectively validate it Key Principle You cannot convert a non-marriage in England into a valid marriage by registering it abroad. This is a strong reaffirmation of territorial validity rules. Relationship with Earlier Authorities This case aligns with: Hudson v Leigh Akhter v Khan Key continuity: Case Principle Hudson v Leigh Non-marriages exist Akhter v Khan Nikkah often non-qualifying MA v WK Foreign registration cannot fix defect Policy Considerations The court implicitly reinforces: A. Certainty in marriage law Clear boundaries on legal status B. Protection of statutory scheme Prevents circumvention via foreign registration C. Distinction between: Religious marriage Legal marriage Practical Consequences For parties If classified as non-marriage: No financial remedy claims No spousal maintenance No inheritance rights as spouse For practitioners Critical to: Identify status early Consider: cohabitation claims Schedule 1 claims trusts/property remedies Conceptual Importance This case reinforces a strict hierarchy: Status Legal effect Valid marriage Full rights Void marriage Financial remedies available Non-marriage No matrimonial rights MA v WK firmly places these Nikkah ceremonies in the third category Key Takeaways Nikkah ceremonies in England often = non-qualifying ceremonies Foreign registration cannot cure invalidity Location of ceremony is decisive Legal formalities must be complied with at the time What this means MA v WK [2025] EWFC 499 confirms: A religious ceremony conducted in England that does not comply with the Marriage Act cannot later be transformed into a valid marriage by foreign registration. It is a strict, formalistic decision reinforcing the boundary between religious and legal marriage. For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra direct access family barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk For a short video on this topic please click here For the full judgment please click here
Court of Appeal (Sir Andrew McFarlane P) — Who is a “father” for parental responsibility?
concerning fifteen applications for declarations that it is lawful for gametes or embryos to continue to be stored and used in circumstances where written consent to storage had expired.
An analysis of Re B (A Child) [2009] UKSC 5 Supreme Court — Residence dispute between father and grandmother Core issue: Is there any presumption in favour of a biological parent over a non-parent (grandparent)? Facts Child (≈4 years old) had lived since birth with his maternal grandmother The grandmother held a residence order Both parents (particularly the father) sought to take over care The father’s application was supported by the mother Procedural history: Trial court → child stays with grandmother High Court + Court of Appeal → transfer to father Supreme Court → grandmother appeals Issue Should the court prefer a biological parent over a long-term caregiver (grandmother)? Or: Is there a legal presumption favouring parents ? Decision ✔ Appeal allowed ✔ Child remained with grandmother The Supreme Court restored the original decision of the trial court. Key Reasoning A. Welfare principle is absolute Under the Children Act: The child’s welfare is the paramount consideration No additional rules or presumptions override this. B. No presumption in favour of biological parents This is the central holding : Biology is important But it is not decisive There is no legal priority for parents The Court rejected the idea (misread from earlier case law) that: Children should normally be brought up by their parents Instead: Parenthood is just one factor in welfare , not a rule. C. Error of the lower courts The High Court and Court of Appeal had: Over-emphasised the father’s biological status Treated parenthood as carrying special weight The Supreme Court held this was: ❌ Wrong in law D. Importance of continuity of care The child had: Lived with grandmother his entire life A stable, secure attachment The court emphasised: Disrupting established care requires strong justification E. No hierarchy of carers The Court confirmed: Parent vs grandparent is not a ranked contest The only test is: What arrangement best serves the child’s welfare? Legal Principles Established 1. No presumption for parents There is no rule that a child should live with biological parents. 2. Welfare is the sole determinant All factors (including biology) feed into: the welfare checklist — nothing more. 3. Continuity is highly significant Long-term caregiving arrangements carry substantial weight . 4. Non-parents can “win” Grandparents or others can: ✔ obtain residence ✔ retain residence ✔ defeat parental claims Importance for Grandparent Cases This is one of the strongest authorities supporting grandparents . It shows: Grandparents are not legally “second class” carers A long-standing caregiving role can outweigh: biological parenthood parental preference Doctrinal Significance Re B is a foundational modern authority because it: Clarifies misinterpretation of Re G (Children) Rejects any “parental priority” doctrine Reinforces pure welfare-based decision-making Key Quote (Principle) In substance, the Court held: Parenthood matters — but only insofar as it promotes the child’s welfare. Bottom Line Re B (2009) UKSC 5 establishes that: There is no presumption favouring parents Grandparents can successfully retain or obtain care The decisive factor is always: What arrangement best serves the child’s welfare — nothing else For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra Direct Access Family Barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk
High Court (Poole J) — Appeal on set aside for fraudulent non-disclosure and delay
RKV v JWC Family Court – Financial Remedies (Recorder Rhys Taylor) Topic: Litigation misconduct, disclosure failures, dissipation, and costs in financial remedy proceedings. This is a significant conduct and disclosure case within financial remedy jurisprudence. It illustrates how extreme litigation behaviour can affect credibility, evidence, and ultimately costs—even where the substantive outcome remains broadly equal. Procedural Context The case concerned a final hearing in financial remedy proceedings following a long marriage . The litigation became complex because of: Criminal convictions affecting the husband Repeated non-disclosure Satellite applications (freezing orders, banking disclosure, LSPO etc.) Allegations of dissipation of assets The underlying asset base was approximately £4 million . Despite the asset pool being relatively straightforward, the proceedings became prolonged due to the husband's conduct. Key Factual Features Important factual elements included: Husband’s criminal conviction The husband had been convicted of criminal offences and imprisoned, affecting his ability to manage business interests. Corporate restructuring The husband operated businesses through several entities: Company X – dissolved after failure to file accounts Company Y – incorporated immediately afterwards Company Z – later formed, with the husband as majority shareholder The wife argued that Company Z was effectively a continuation of the earlier business and therefore a matrimonial asset. Asset transfers After separation the husband transferred approximately £530,000 to third parties , including his daughter. The wife alleged these were dissipation attempts . Disclosure Failures and Relief from Sanctions A major procedural issue was the husband’s persistent non-compliance with disclosure obligations . Examples included: Failure to produce valuation evidence Late or incomplete financial disclosure Failure to engage with single joint experts Breach of court orders triggering an unless order The first three days of the hearing dealt with the husband's application for relief from sanctions , which the judge ultimately granted so the trial could proceed. Judicial Assessment of Evidence The judge found: The husband was “an unsatisfactory witness” His financial evidence was “chaotic and opaque” The wife’s evidence was preferred in most areas. As a result, where the husband failed to provide proper evidence: ➡️ The court adopted the wife’s figures. This illustrates a common financial remedy principle: Failure to disclose properly permits the court to draw adverse inferences. Treatment of Corporate Assets A key issue was whether Company Z should be treated as matrimonial property. The wife argued it was a continuation of the earlier marital business . The court accepted the wife’s approach and treated the business as part of the matrimonial asset pool. This reflects the established principle that: Corporate restructuring cannot be used to avoid sharing claims . Add-Back Allegations The wife sought an add-back for the £530,000 transferred by the husband post-separation. Add-back claims require proof of reckless or wanton dissipation . Although the court examined these transfers, the judgment primarily resolved the case using the sharing principle rather than punitive adjustments. Application of the Sharing Principle The judge concluded that both parties’ needs could be met through a sharing-based division of the matrimonial assets. Outcome: Wife: 51% Husband: 49% The slight departure from equality reflected fairness considerations in the circumstances. Litigation Conduct The most striking feature of the case was the husband's extreme litigation misconduct , including: Persistent failure to comply with orders Aggressive and obstructive litigation behaviour Repeated late disclosure Attempts to re-litigate settled issues Conduct that increased costs dramatically The court described his behaviour as “appalling” and outside normal litigation standards. Costs Consequences Because of this misconduct, the court made a rare indemnity costs order . Key elements: Husband ordered to pay £159,558 in costs Plus 70% of the “costs of the costs” application (£3,893.75) Total payable: £163,451.75 Indemnity costs are exceptional and are usually reserved for conduct that is: unreasonable abusive of process significantly outside the norm. Legal Significance A. Litigation conduct matters Although conduct during the marriage is rarely relevant to financial division, conduct during litigation can have major consequences . This case shows: courts may impose indemnity costs where behaviour obstructs justice. B. Disclosure failures backfire Where a party: withholds financial evidence breaches court directions the court may simply accept the other party’s valuation evidence . C. Equality remains the starting point Even with severe misconduct, the court did not adjust the asset division significantly . Instead, it dealt with misconduct through costs orders . This reflects the orthodox approach under Miller/McFarlane principles . Practical Lessons for Practitioners For parties Non-compliance with disclosure obligations is extremely risky. The court may: infer hidden assets accept the other party’s numbers impose punitive costs. For lawyers The case demonstrates the importance of: early disclosure enforcement forensic banking evidence freezing orders where dissipation is suspected. Bottom Line RKV v JWC is a cautionary financial remedies case showing that: obstruction and concealment during litigation will severely damage credibility courts will draw adverse inferences equality may still apply to the asset pool but costs sanctions can be substantial . The judgment therefore reinforces an important procedural message: financial remedy litigation requires full, honest, and timely disclosure. For family law advice and family court representation contact Stephanie Heijdra direct access family barrister via sheijdra[@]winvolvedlegal.co.uk Read the full judgment here